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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ROAD CLOSURES CAUSED BY NATURAL 
HAZARDS - CASE STUDY KAIKOURA 
By Joshua Clydesdale 
The New Zealand road network is vital to the economic wellbeing of the nation. The 
road network is, however, vulnerable to closure from a host of natural hazards. Road 
closures caused by natural hazards adversely effect the movement of freight and 
people between nodes. Link security is of particular importance to communities 
separated from major urban centres, particularly when alternative road links (if any) 
condition costly deviations. 
This research inv~stigates the vulnerability of the road network in the Kaikoura 
District to closure from natural hazards and estimates the costs of road network 
disruption for road-users and non-users. The road network in the Kaikoura District 
is sparse and has historically been disrupted by natural hazards. The 'potential' cost 
of road network disruption for road-users and non-users exceeds $0.25 million per 
day when road-users are required to detour to the Lewis Pass route. However, total 
disruption costs are significantly lower when a low-cost alternative route (Highway 
70) is available. 
Link reinstatement priorities are provided according to road-user cost and non-user 
cost minimisation and the strategic importance of the State Highway 1 link to the 
north of Kaikoura has been emphasised. It is recommended that a New Zealand 
wide risk analysis study be conducted to provide a cohesive and comprehensive 
information base applicable to the management of the New Zealand road network. 
Keywords: road network, natural hazard, road closure, Kaikoura District. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The road network is of vital importance to the economic wellbeing of communities 
in New Zealand (Transit NZ, 1993). The New Zealand road network is, however, 
vulnerable to closure from natural hazards. 'The combination of steep terrain, high 
rainfall, and frequent earthquakes mean that most of New Zealand is subject to 
natural events that may close roads' (Whitehouse and McSaveney, 1992:27). 
'One may consider a road network as a system of points and lines as in a graph, the 
points (or nodes) being the urban centres or road junctions and the lines the 
individual road links via which inter-nodal interaction takes place' (Kissling, 
1969:113). Road closures caused by natural hazards do not allow the road network 
to function to its full potential because a change in the network's linkages brings 
about a change in the accessibility of each node in the network (Taaffe et al., 1996). 
The closure of some links (eg. state highways) may have significant impacts on 
nodal accessibility, 'principally where there is no alternative route, or where the 
alternative route is prohibitively expensive' (Butcher, 1985a:11). Links in a network 
can, therefore, be assigned importance values, for example, in terms of distance, 
time, or the cost of travel (Kissling, 1969). By quantifying linkage importance, the 
cost of changes in network accessibility can be measured. 
'Network theory is concerned with alternative links and describes the options, the 
probability of options being simultaneously closed, and the costs of using various 
network options' (Butcher, 1985a:17). However, network theory only addresses the 
costs to road-users of detouring to alternative links and does not account for other 
costs associated with road network disruption. 
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The costs of road closures caused by natural hazards include: 
1. Road-user costs - which refer to the additional costs incurred by road-users (eg. 
travel time costs, vehicle operating costs and accident costs) as a result of 
vehicles being required to detour to alternative links; 
2. Link reinstatement costs - which refer to th~ cost of restoring a safe, trafficable 
link; and 
3. Non-user costs (or costs to other parties) - which refer to the costs of interruption 
and disruption of economic activities as a result of changes in nodal accessibility 
(Green et aI., 1983). A road closure may, for example, isolate a community, 
thereby affecting the input (eg. supplies) and output (eg. sale of goods) 
requirements of that community. 
This research focuses on road-user costs and non-user costs of road network 
disruption in the Kaikoura District. Additional time costs, vehicle operating costs 
and accident costs incurred by road-users as a result of road closure events are easily 
measured using established methodologies (see Transfund NZ, 1997a). However, 
non-user costs have received little research attention because of the complex and 
diffuse nature of these costs (Green et al., 1983). In New Zealand, for example, only 
anecdotal reports of non-user costs are normally reported (eg. see Birch, 1998), even 
though much of the impact of network disruption may be felt by non-users (Butcher, 
1985a). Impacts on 'local economies and communities, although potentially quite 
disruptive, have for the most part been overlooked by planners' (Monroe and 
Ballard, 1983:23). 
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1.2 Goal and objectives of study 
Road closures caused by natural hazards adversely effect the economic benefits the 
road network provides (Transit NZ, 1998a). The goal of this study is, therefore, to: 
Investigate the economic impact of road network disruption in the Kaikoura District. 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To identify the costs of past network disruptions III New Zealand and 
internationally. 
2. To conduct a historical review of road network disruption in the Kaikoura District 
and identify the risk of future disruption. 
3. To identify the importance of road links servicing Kaikoura based on current 
traffic flow and costs of diversion. 
4. To identify the costs of road network disruption for businesses in the Kaikoura 
District, including the length of time businesses can sustain road dislocation. 
There is a statutory obligation to provide a safe and efficient road network that 
contributes to the economic wellbeing of communities in New Zealand (Transit NZ, 
1993). Adverse effects, including any actual or potential effects of natural hazards, 
need to be avoided, remedied or mitigated (ibid). This research provides a greater 
awareness of the risk of closure in the Kaikoura District. 'Identification of hazards 
and assessment of their frequency of realisation provide an aid in planning 
improvements to, or relocation of, highways to minimise maintenance costs and 
traffic disruption through highway closure' (Whitehouse and McSaveney, 1992:27). 
Complementing this perspective, this research provides a greater understanding of 
the costs of road closures caused by natural hazards. The output of this research 
establishes priorities for the reinstatement of links providing access to Kaikoura 
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according to road-user cost and non-user cost minimisation. Few studies in New 
Zealand have systematically explored these topics. 
1.3 Location of study area 
The Kaikoura District is located along the East Coast of the South Island (see Figure 
1.1). The District stretches from just north of the Conway River to just north of 
Kekerengu (Kaikoura District Council, 1996). The Inland Kaikoura Range forms the 
western boundary of the District, while the Pacific Ocean forms the eastern boundary 
of the District (ibid). 
State Highway 1 is the principal highway in the Kaikoura District (see Figure 1.1). 
Kaikoura is located 132km south of Blenheim and 189km north of Christchurch. 
Highway 70 (Inland Road) joins State Highway 1 just south of Kaikoura and 
provides an alternative route south. No alternative link is available in the Kaikoura 
District for State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura. 
1.4 Research framework 
Any research into the effects of natural hazards involves consideration of risk 
analysis (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997). Risk analysis is defined as 'the 
systematic use of available information to determine how often hazards may occur 
and the magnitude of their consequences' (Helm, 1996:2). The first stage of this 
research involved the natural hazard assessment. The objective of the natural hazard 
assessment was to provide insights into the vulnerability of the road network in the 
Kaikoura District to closure. The consequences (or costs) of road network 
disruption for road-users and non-users were then estimated (stage 2 and stage 3). 
A range of methodologies were applied in this research. For ease of interpretation, 
the methodologies applied in each of the three stages of this research are described in 
later chapters. 
1----·---------------------------~ 
N 
LEGEND 
6. HIGHWAY NUMBER 
30 o 30 Kilometers 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Figure 1.1: Kaikoura District 
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1.5 Chapter outlines 
Chapter 2 describes the costs of past road closure events both internationally and 
within New Zealand. Chapter 3 describes the risk of road network disruption in the 
Kaikoura District, including the methodology applied. Chapter 4 estimates the 
additional costs incurred by road-users as a result of road closure events in the 
Kaikoura District. The road-user cost methodology is also described. Chapter 5 
estimates non-user costs of road network disruption in the Kaikoura District through 
a survey of local businesses. The non-user cost methodology is also described. 
Chapter 6 concludes this research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the costs of past road closure events both internationally and 
within New Zealand. A review of annual link reinstatement costs (or emergency 
work expenditure) summarises the extent of road network disruption in New 
Zealand. 
2.2 Past disruptions internationally 
2.2.1 Kobe Earthquake, Japan 
On January 17, 1995 a Magnitude 7.2 earthquake struck the city of Kobe, Japan 
(Chung, 1996). Most of Kobe City is built on a narrow coastal plain that is heavily 
urbanised and industrialised (ibid). The physical environment constraints 
conditioned a series of tightly compressed transport networks often adjacent to, or 
above one another (Buckle et aI., 1996). Unfortunately, the coastal corridor 'lay 
directly above the ruptured fault zone, so all major transportation networks in Kobe 
were severely damaged' (ibid: 164). 
'The massive simultaneous failures of virtually all of Kobe's major transportation 
networks - highways, local railways, the Shinkansen (Bullet Train) and port facilities 
imposed an economic paralysis on the region' (Chang and Taylor, 1995:334). The 
cost of disruption also had nation-wide repercussions because 'Kobe sits astride the 
principal transportation corridor between the central and south-western part of 
Japan's main island, Honshu' (EQE Engineering, 1995:1). In addition, the extensive 
damage to the port of Kobe 'disrupted shipping throughout Asia because of the 
critical role the city's port played as a transhipment point' (Tobin and Montz, 
1997:250). Several industries (including some computer components manufacturers) 
were affected around the world (ibid). 
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Road network damage in Kobe was extensive. 'The worst damage was to the 
elevated Hanshin Expressway' (Macaulay and Clay, 1996:60). A 'half-kilometre 
length of four-lane highway toppled at a forty-five degree angle after fifteen huge 
reinforced concrete supporting pillars broke off at their bases' (ibid). The total 
repair cost for the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation was estimated to be 
US$4.6 billion (Buckle et aI., 1996). 
Non-damaged surface streets provided the only land access along the coastal 
corridor and these streets became heavily congested (EQE Engineering, 1995). 'The 
supply of materials and staff on-site for reconstruction was gravely hampered by 
damage to, and congestion in, the transport system' (McLean, 1998:29) . 
. Due to the extent of damage to the transport infrastructure, 'the cost of disruption in 
Kobe seems likely to entail economic consequences of a sort previously not 
experienced in a modern urban area' (Chang and Taylor, 1995:334). The total 
economic loss 'is estimated to reach US$200 billion, making it the costliest 
earthquake in the world thus far' (Chung, 1996:1). 
2.2.2 Tasman Bridge collapse, Australia 
In January, 1975 the Tasman Bridge, which 'formed the only direct road link across 
the Derwent River in Hobart, collapsed after being hit by an ore carrier' (Wood and 
Lee, 1979:1). The bridge closure effectively isolated 30 per cent of Hobart's 
population resident in the eastern shore from accessing the Central Business District 
(CBD) (ibid). 
Between January and December, 1975 cross-river movement of people and goods 
was limited to ferry transport or a lengthy road journey of approximately 50km (Lee 
and Wood, 1981). However, at the time of the collapse, only two small ferries with 
a capacity of four-hundred people operated on the Derwent River and there was a 
shortage of infrastructure (eg. car parking) to support increased ferry use (Lee and 
Wood, 1981). Ferry transport necessitated a multi-modal trip and significant extra 
time costs for cross-river movement. In addition, the alternative road links were 
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. mostly unsealed rural roads that were not designed to support increased traffic 
volumes (Wood and Lee, 1979). Road-users incurred additional time costs, vehicle 
operating costs and accident costs by diverting the additional 50km. 
After the bridge collapse, many CBD businesses 'found it necessary to devise new 
delivery and servicing arrangements so that they could continue to' operate on a 
metropolitan-wide basis' (Lee and Wood, 1981:128). However, a small number of 
businesses refused to deliver goods across the river (because of the additional costs), 
while other firms reduced the frequency of service and imposed substantial delivery 
charges (ibid). 
For almost twelve months, the normal functioning of many aspects of city life was 
. severely disrupted (Lee and Wood, 1981). In December, 1975 a temporary bailey 
bridge (with a limited vehicle capacity) was constructed 5km upstream from the 
Tasman Bridge (Wood and Lee,'1979). However, it was not until thirty-four months 
after the bridge collapse, when the Tasman Bridge was reopened, that regular 
transportation movements were again established (ibid). 
2.3 Past disruptions in New Zealand 
2.3.1 State Highway 3, Taranaki and Waikato regions, North Island 
On March 12, 1997 a '35 metre section of the northbound lane of State Highway 3, 
94km north of New Plymouth, slipped into the Awakino River and severed the link 
for one week' (Taranaki Regional Council, 1997:1). The cost of the week-long 
disruption was considerable because 'State Highway 3 north of New Plymouth is the 
only major road link between Taranaki and the northern half of the North Island' 
(ibid). 
Average annual daily traffic (AADT) passing through this section of State Highway 
3 is approximately 1637 vehicles, of which 23 per cent are heavy commercial 
vehicles (Harris Consulting, 1997). Road-users had six alternative routes available. 
Three state highways south of the slip site required extra travel distances of 120km, 
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325km and 375km (ibid). Three shorter detour routes were available. However, 
these routes were mostly unsealed and were unsuitable for use by heavy commercial 
vehicles (Taranaki Regional Council, 1997). 
Harris Consulting (1997) estimated that the majority of vehicles that opted for the 
shorter detours were cars and light or medium commercial vehicles. Road-users 
opting for shorter detours faced difficult driving conditions, with anecdotal reports 
identifying numerous minor accidents and delays (Taranaki Regional Council, 
1997). Accident costs on each of the two northern unsealed routes were estimated to 
be $21,600 for the duration of the closure (Harris Consulting, 1997). 
Harris Consulting (1997) estimated that the greatest detour costs ($396,816) incurred 
. by road-users during the week-long closure resulted from the additional 325km (4 
hours) travel on State Highway 4. The majority of heavy commercial vehicles 
detoured to State Highway 4 because it was the closest link that was sealed along its 
entire length (ibid). One transport company alone incurred costs in excess of 
$80,000 during the period of the closure by diverting its trucks to State Highway 4 
(Taranaki Regional Council, 1997). Total detour costs for the week-long closure 
were estimated to be $1.03 million (ibid). 
An incomplete and approximate estimate of business losses 'was made for the week-
long closure, which totalled $0.14 million for the region (Harris Consulting, 1997). 
'Businesses noted that the supply of stock, materials, equipment, parts and produce 
into and out of the region was severely disrupted' (Taranaki Regional Council, 
1997:14). 
Transit NZ reported costs of $220,000 for the initial bailey bridge to bypass the slip 
(Taranaki Regional Council, 1997). In addition, the Road Transport Association 
advised that ongoing costs for heavy vehicle diversions were approximately $5,000 
to $10,000 per month owing to heavy vehicle weight restrictions in place on the 
bailey bridge (ibid). 
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A detour route to restore two-way access was provided in June, 1997. The detour 
route involved construction of a second bailey bridge over the Awakino River (for 
northbound traffic) upstream of the slip site. Construction of 400 metres of 
temporary highway through farmland and a second bailey bridge cost a further 
$700,000 (Transit NZ, 1997). A permanent solution involved realigning the road by 
constructing two new bridges (Cox, pers. com.). The cost of this realignment was a 
further $4.2 million (Transit NZ, 1998b). 
North of the Awakino Gorge slip site, two major slips in July and October, 1998 
again severed State Highway 3. Ten days of heavy rain triggered a giant slip in July, 
1998 that took approximately 100 metres of State Highway 3 down a slope (NZPA, 
1998). State Highway 3 was closed to all traffic for two days and to heavy 
commercial vehicles for three days (Beca Carter Hollings and Ferner, 1999). The 
road network of the Waikato region was extensively damaged in July. Thirty-nine 
road closures were recorded in the region in July, with the combined duration of 
disruption totalling 841 hours (an average of 21.5 hours per event) (derived from 
information provided by Runciman, pers. com.). 
Storms in October, 1998 resulted in further costs to road-users and non-users. The 
second major slip on State Highway 3 occurred in close proximity to the July slip 
site. The region's rail link to the central North Island was also closed in October as 
a result of a mudslide (Holdom and Maetzig, 1998). According to media reports, 
business losses from network disruption were widespread. The Taranaki Motel 
Association, for example, reported that moteliers were receiving cancellations 
because of the uncertainty that prevailed over the condition of the transport network 
(Birch, 1998). 
In December, 1998 a project to rebuild State Highway 3 at the two slip sites 
commenced (Beca Carter Hollings and Ferner, 1999). A sealed 26km bypass route 
was established to enable full highway reconstruction works to be carried out (Cox, 
pers. com.). Transit NZ spent approximately $7 million on highway reconstruction at 
the main slip sites and improving and maintaining the detour route (Transit NZ, 
1999a). State Highway 3 was reopened on March 20, 1999 (ibid). 
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2.3.2 State Highway 3, Manawatu region, North Island 
The Manawatu Gorge is located between Palmerston North and Woodville on State 
Highway 3 and provides a key link to the Hawkes Bay region (Kitchin, 1998). The 
highway has been closed for an average of two in every one-hundred days in the past 
eleven years (ibid). 
Disruption in the Gorge was particularly severe in 1995, when the link was closed for 
a total of sixty-nine days over a fifteen-week period (Morgan, 1995). Initially, the 
link was closed on July 27 following a large slip (see Photo 2.1) and was reopened 
briefly on August 3 before a second (and larger) slip severed the link (Transit NZ, 
1995a). The latter slip closed the link for nearly three weeks. 
Photo 2.1: Large slip on State Highway 3, Manawatu Gorge 
Source: Transit NZ (1995a) 
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Approximately 5500 vehicles used this link daily in 1995 (Morgan, 1995), with a 
high proportion of heavy vehicle usage (generally over 600 heavy commercial 
vehicles per day). Nearby alternative links were available, although these links were 
severely damaged by increased traffic volumes (ibid). Highway reinstatement costs 
exceeded $3 million in 1995 (ibid). However, no account of road-user costs or non-
users costs was undertaken. More recently, slips closed the link for six days in July, 
1998 (Mildenhall, pers. com.). Link reinstatement costs in July were approximately 
, 
$500,000 (ibid). 
2.3.3 State Highway 6, West Coast region, South Island 
On August 19, 1998 a large slip 20km south-west of Haast Pass closed State 
Highway 6 for one week (Transit NZ, 1998c) (see Photo 2.2). The area bordering 
Lake Wanaka is prone to regular slips that are triggered by heavy rainfall (ibid). One-
way access was established seven days after the initial event (Jarvis, pers. com.). Full 
link reinstatement was completed twenty-three days after the initial slip (ibid). 
Photo 2.2: State Highway 6 slip, August 1998 
Source: Transit NZ (1998c) 
14 
Approximately 411 vehicles use this section of State Highway 6 daily and it is 
r~cognised as both a tourist and scenic route (Transit NZ, 1998a). Road-users 
travelling to or from the West Coast were severely affected. The only detour route 
available was via State Highway 73, more than 300km north of the slip site. The 
total cost of link reinstatement was estimated to be $458,000 (Jarvis, pers. com.). 
However, no account of road-user costs or non-user costs was undertaken. 
The road network in the West Coast region is often closed by rain-induced natural 
hazards. For example, in 1994 State Highway 6 was just one of many highways in 
the region closed from flooding. 'In just thirty-six hours, 322mm of rain fell over 
the Milford to Haast catchment area, causing about $7.7 million worth of damage' 
(Transit NZ, 1995b:l). More than 100km of highway needed to be reinstated, which 
. took more than twelve months to complete (ibid). 
2.4 Annual link reinstatement costs 
Link reinstatement costs are a significant source of expenditure for road controlling 
authorities in New Zealand (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Link reinstatement costs in the 1998/99 financial year 
Link reinstatement costs 1998/99 ($M) Percentage of National 
Roading Programme 
Local roads 18.5 2.1 
State highways 34.5 4.0 
Total 53.0 6.1 
Source: Transfund NZ (1999a) 
Of the $34.5 million spent on state highways in the 1998/99 financial year, 89 per 
cent was spent on restoration works in the North Island, while 11 per cent was spent 
on restoration works in the South Island (Transfund NZ, 1999b). Seventy-five 
emergency work projects were completed in total, mainly in the Northland, Waikato, 
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Bay of Plenty, Taranaki and Manawatu regions (Transit NZ, 1999b). In the 
Kaikoura District, there have been no state highway closures in the past two years 
that have required link reinstatement funding (Hunter, pers. com.). 
The level of emergency work expenditure varies considerably on an annual basis 
because of natural variations in hazard occurrence. The 1998/99 state highway 
expenditure was, for example, 184 per cent higher than the 1997/98 expenditure (see 
Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: State Highway link reinstatement costs between 1995 and 1999 
Description Unit 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
Cost $M 15.64 14.11 12.13 34.5 
Single-lane access restored 
within 12 hours of the Percent 78 82 87 79 
substantial end to the event 
Source: Transfund NZ (1999a); Transit NZ (1998d); Transit NZ (l999b). 
In the 1998/99 financial year, 'expenditure to reinstate storm damage on state 
highways in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions exceeded the national state 
highway emergency works target of $13.50 million' (Transfund NZ, 1999a:45). 
Accordingly, other roading projects had to be deferred to offset the additional 
emergency work expenditure in the 1998/99 financial year (ibid). For example, 
preventative maintenance expenditure, which is defined as 'non-routine maintenance 
works to protect the serviceability of the road asset and to minimise the threat of 
road closure' (Transit NZ, 1999b:20), was deferred to make available funding for 
emergency work restoration. Preventative maintenance expenditure was $1.6 million 
less than the forecast $3.1 million expenditure in the 1998/99 financial year 
(Transfund NZ, 1999a). 
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The severity of road network damage in 1998/99 is also seen in the lower percentage 
of closure events having single-lane access restored within twelve hours of the 
substantial end to the event compared to the 1997/98 year. Of all recorded state 
highway closure events in 1998/99, thirty-one closures did not have single-lane 
access restored within twelve hours of the substantial end to the event (Transit NZ, 
1999b). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The impacts of the Kobe earthquake and the Tasman Bridge collapse highlight the 
importance of link security to road-users and non-users. Changes in network 
accessibility from simultaneous linkage failures or from failure of a single link can 
result in significant costs. 
In New Zealand, road closures caused by natural hazards can disrupt the road 
network for extended durations. Road closures often condition significant costs for 
road-users because the national road network is sparse. Non-user costs are also likely 
to be significant. However, non-user costs are generally not included in disruption 
cost estimates. Link reinstatement costs comprise a significant portion of the 
National Roading Programme budget. In contrast, preventative maintenance 
expenditure is constrained by limited funding and is significantly lower than post-
disruption restoration costs. 
The following chapter describes the risk of road network disruption in the Kaikoura 
District. 
17 
Chapter 3: Natural hazard assessment 
3.1 Introduction 
The Resource Management Act 1991 defines natural hazard to mean: 
'any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquakes, 
tsunami, erosion, volcanic arid geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, 
sedimentation, wind, drought, fire, or flooding) the action of which adversely effects 
human life, property, or other aspects of the environment.' 
The road network in the Kaikoura District is vulnerable to closure from a host of 
. natural hazards. The District's climate; steep, small coastal catchments; and its 
geology all contribute to the hazard threat (Bowring et aI., 1978). Earthquakes, 
tsunami, coastal erosion/inundation, landslides, floods and snow can disrupt the road 
network. This chapter describes the vulnerability of the road network in the 
Kaikoura District to these hazards and outlines the methodology applied. 
3.2 Natural hazard assessment methodology 
Natural hazards literature was reviewed to provide an overview of the hazard threat 
in the Kaikoura District. Government bodies, tertiary institutions, and private sector 
organisations were also contacted to obtain supplementary hazards information. 
However, the acquisition of natural hazards information had various shortcomings. 
Hazard information is often widely dispersed and little information relating 
specifically to road network vulnerability is available. For example, road controlling 
authorities have little coordinated and comprehensive information about natural 
hazards on principal highway links. In addition, little research has been conducted on 
some hazard sources. For example, the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences 
(IGNS) has yet to map landslide hazards in the Kaikoura District. 
A historical review of past disruptions was conducted to provide more detailed 
information about the vulnerability of the road network. Post-1950 editions of the 
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Kaikoura Star newspaper were reviewed. The newspaper review was complemented 
by a search of former Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) files held at the 
National Archives, Christchurch. Flood damage reports between the years of 1951 
and 1986 were reviewed (National Archives, 1999). The archive search extended to 
Opus International Consultants, Christchurch, for the period of 1992 to 1996. 
Records from 1996 to 1999 were obtained from Montgomery Watson, Christchurch 
and from Opus International, Greymouth. Appendix 1 lists the dates and locations of 
all disruptions recorded. This information was used to derive a map depicting sites 
of past disruptions on State Highway 1 (see Figure 3.1). 
Past closure information is in different forms, widely dispersed, and difficult to 
access. The different reporting styles and quality of information (eg. no specific 
. closure locations or durations are often specified), only allowed a general and 
incomplete account of past closures to be assessed. No definite closure relationships 
(eg. probability distributions) could be derived because of the incomplete data set. 
In the review of natural hazards on State Highway 73, Whitehouse (1990:47) states 
that 'the most useful source of information came from the memories of the highway 
overseer.' Accordingly, past and present highway engineers were consulted to 
complement the historical review and provide insights into potentially vulnerable 
areas. 
Detailed technical investigations were beyond the scope of this research. Instead, 
the approach adopted provided a broad overview of the closure threat in the District. 
As stated by Helm (1996:5), 'regardless of the degree of formal evaluation, there are 
unquestionable benefits in knowing as much as possible about local hazards.' 
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Figure 3.1: Past disruptions on State Highway 1 
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3.3 Coastal hazards 
3.3.1 Coastal erosion and seawater inundation 
The Kaikoura Coastline is subject to coastal erosion and seawater inundation 
because it is exposed to high-energy oceanic swell and stonn waves (Kirk, 1985). 
Large waves may be received at any time of the year and it is common for stonns to 
be attended by surge components which superelevate the sea-level (ibid). Stonn 
surge components of sea-level rise in Canterbury may exceed 1 metre and this results 
in both greater breaker heights at the shore and greater inland penetration of runup 
(Kirk and Todd, 1994). 
Road network disruption may be caused by: 
• erosional encroachment leading to a loss of support and collapse; 
• inundation by seawater from the runup of broken waves and/or from ponded fresh 
water; 
• scour by runup and/or fresh water flow; 
• damage by direct wave impact; and 
• sediment deposition by wave action (Kirk and Todd, 1994:38). 
The Canterbury Regional Council (1994) defines a hazard zone that contains land at 
risk from coastal erosion. In many parts of the Kaikoura District, this hazard zone 
borders State Highway 1 and in places, this zone encompasses the highway (eg. just 
north of Oaro). Of greatest concern is the area of State Highway 1 that runs adjacent 
to the coastline. Approximately llkm of highly exposed coast carrying both State 
Highway 1 and the South Island Main Trunk Railway (SIMTR) occurs south of 
Kaikoura between Oaro and the Kahutara River and a further 10km occurs to the 
north of Kaikoura between the Hapuku River and the Clarence River (Kirk, 1985) 
(see Figure 3.1). At both Oaro and Goose Bay beaches, wave run-up during stonn 
events is known to flow across State Highway 1 (Kirk, 1985; Kirk and Todd, 1994). 
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Some 4.7km of seawall protects State Highway 1 against erosion and storm waves 
along these coastal strips (Kaikoura District Council, 1998). However, the protection 
structures 'refer' erosion to adjacent unprotected areas and many of the works are 
inadequate and will fail, either in whole or in part, at some time (Kirk, pers. com.). 
For example, in 1985 two major sea-storm events caused wide-scale erosion of State 
Highway 1 (see Appendix 1). The total damage to the highway and coastal works 
was estimated to be $1.3 million, of which some $500,000 dollars was required to 
realign State Highway 1 at Ohau Point (Kirk, 1985). 'The storm which occurred in 
July, 1985 has been estimated to have a return period of 50 years' (Opus, 1999:16). 
The historical review of closures indicates that coastal erosion has constituted an 
ongoing threat to State Highway 1. However, damage from coastal erosion has not 
conditioned long-term closure events (eg. for periods of three days or more) 
comparable to rain-induced disruptions (eg. from flooding and slope failures). In 
addition, disruption from coastal erosion has been less frequent than rain-induced 
closures. The last major sea-storm damage occurred in 1985. State Highway 1 is, 
however, subject to a high level of hazard on an ongoing basis (even under normal 
sea conditions) and more severe disruption in the future is possible (Kirk, pers. 
com.). Assuming that future damage will occur, it may not be the failure that blocks 
the highway, but the confined area in which restoration work would need to take 
place (Bates, pers. com; Kirk, pers. com.). 
3.3.2 Tsunami hazard 
'A tsunami is a sequence of waves generated by large disturbances below or near the 
ocean floor' (DeLange, 1998:99). The disturbances that produce tsunami are often 
associated with earthquakes (ibid). 'A distinction is generally made between far-field 
tsunami (remotely generated from the target area) and near-field tsunami (created in 
or close to the target area)' (Kirk and Todd, 1994:47). Ten reports of tsunami (all 
far-field events) have been recorded in Canterbury between 1840 and 1982 
(DeLange and Healy, 1986). However, recent reports indicate that the Kaikoura 
Coastline is also vulnerable to near-field tsunami (Robson, 1998). It is believed that 
during the next major earthquake, 200 million cubic metres of silt, gravel, and mud 
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washed into the sea by Canterbury's rivers could avalanche into the Hon deep 
Kaikoura Canyon, thereby triggering a tsunami (ibid). 
The effects of the tsunami hazard are difficult to predict because tsunami wave 
behaviour at the shore is extremely variable (Kirk and Todd, 1994). For example, 
'the 1993 Hokkaido-Nansei-Ohi tsunami in Japan varied in height from 5 metres to 
30.5 metres along a short stretch of coast (half a kilometre in length), with the 
damage it caused varying in different places' (DeLange, 1998:107). 
A detailed assessment of the potential damage to the District's road network from 
the tsunami hazard is beyond the scope of this research. However, it is recognised 
that tsunami hazards have an enormous potential to damage assets in the coastal 
environment (Canterbury Regional Council, 1994) and it must be assumed that State 
Highway 1 is vulnerable to damage. Until further research is conducted, no 
frequency of occurrence value 'can be assigned to the tsunami hazard along the 
Kaikoura Coast (Goring, pers. com.). 
3.4 Meteorological hazards 
3.4.1 Flooding 
Kaikoura lies in close proximity to high mountains that are the source of significant 
runoff and vast quantities of moving debris (Thomson and Macarthur, 1969). The 
Seaward Kaikoura Range dominates the District, rising to nearly 2600 metres in just 
over 10km from the coast (Bowring et aI., 1978). Annual rainfall increases from 
800mm near the coast to 1600mm on the peaks (ibid). 
The major river systems in the Kaikoura District are the Clarence River, the Kowhai 
River and the Hapuku River, with smaller systems including the Kahutara River, 
Shingle Fans and the Oaro River (Kaikoura District Council, 1998) (see Figure 3.1). 
The historical review of closures indicates that all of these river systems may close 
State Highway 1 and the Kahutara River and the Kowhai River may also sever 
Highway 70. Just north of the Clarence River, the three Shingle Fans have, for 
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example, frequently disrupted State Highway 1 because of active debris aggradation 
from their catchments (Bell, 1975). State Highway 1 has been closed at these streams 
for periods exceeding 48 hours (eg. in January 1961). The concrete fords were 
supplemented in 1971 by detour bridges that are used during periods of flooding 
(Bowring et al., 1978). However, in a major flood, these bridges may also be 
damaged (Bates, pers. com; Sutton, pers. com.). 
Many of the lesser coastal rivers and streams crossing State Highway 1 and Highway 
70 also have the potential to sever the road network. For example, debris carried by 
streams throughout the Hundalee Hills (see Figure 3.1) can block culverts and the 
diverted flows may scour and undermine State Highway 1 (Sutton, pers. com.). 
A flood that occurred in 1923 highlights the severity of the flood hazard threat in the 
District. The flood. caused widespread damage to the road network servicing 
Kaikoura and damaged nearly every bridge in the District (Anon., 1923a). Rain fell 
heavily for a four-day period, with 25-88 inches of rain recorded (Sherrard, 1998). 
'The heaviest flood known in the history of Kaikoura occurred yesterday. On Friday 
heavy rain began, and continued incessantly throughout Saturday, Sunday, and 
Monday. Rivers and creeks rose rapidly, heavy seas were running, stemming the 
rushing waters at the mouths of the rivers and the surplus, surging water inundated 
the District...Kaikoura is isolated, except by steamer service. From a general 
observation, it appears as if it would be best to concentrate first on the Inland Route 
to Waiau, as the difficulties to be experienced are less on this route than the 
southern road to Christchurch or the road to Blenheim. No doubt, one of these 
routes will be made availablefor traffic within a month'(Anon., 1923a:7}. 
Floodwaters washed away two spans of the Clarence River bridge and for two years 
a large punt shuttled goods and people across the river (Sherrard, 1998). The river 
bank was subjected to so much erosion that is was 150 feet wider than it was before 
the flood' (Anon., 1923b:21). 
24 
3.4.2 Snow 
The road network in the Kaikoura District is vulnerable to closure from heavy 
snowfall. The historical review of closures indicates that closures from snowfall are 
restricted to the links south of Kaikoura, usually through the Hundalee Hills on State 
Highway 1 or along Highway 70. For example, in 1992 heavy snowfall closed State 
Highway I overnight, while Highway 70 was closed for three days (see Appendix 1). 
Research suggests that severe snowfalls in Canterbury occur as often as one in four 
years (Owens, 1994). However, snow and or ice seldom close the road network for 
more than three days. 
3.5 Landslide hazards 
Landslides are caused by a variety of factors, including: 
• 'those induced by intense or prolonged rainfall; 
• those generated by earthquakes; and 
• other (generally slow moving) types' (Bell, 1994:55). 
Landslide hazards most commonly occur in areas that have significant relief, and 
they may either cover the road surface or include the road surface (Bell, 1975). Bell 
(1976:190) concluded that 'the geologic and geomorphic setting of the Kaikoura 
District is favourable for extensive mass movements, given the requisite seismic or 
climatic trigger.' 
3.5.1 Rain-induced landslides 
In the Kaikoura District, rainstorms originating to the north of New Zealand (usually 
as extra-tropical cyclones) have historically caused considerable mass movement 
damage (Bell and Owens, 1979). The predominantly small coastal catchments 
respond dramatically in intense rainstorms, causing debris flows, aggradation, 
deposition and flooding (Bell, 1976). 'Debris flows are rapid flows of saturated soil, 
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rock and organic debris down steep mountainous channels' (Paterson, 1996:344). 
Debris flows 'have the capacity to take out bridges and leave large obstacles on the 
highway' (Whitehouse and McSaveney, 1992:28). 
The historical review of closures indicates that rain-induced slips and rockfalls have 
been the most frequent source of network disruption in the Kaikoura District. Rain-
induced hazards have also caused the longest link severances in the District. Figure 
3.1 shows that many slope failures have occurred north of Kaikoura between the 
Clarence River and the Hapuku River and south of Kaikoura between the Kahutara 
River and Daro. In these sections, State Highway 1 is confined to a narrow, rugged 
area at the foot of steep bluffs and cliffs that rise abruptly to 400 metres (Bell, 1975). 
In the Hundalee Hills, State Highway 1 is also prone to closure from slope failures. 
Many areas are affected by slow slumping of the slopes on which they are built 
(Bowring et al., 1978). 
The 1975 Cyclone Alison event best depicts the vulnerability of the road network in 
the Kaikoura District to rain-induced slope failures. On the night of Wednesday 
March 12, 1975 State Highway 1 and the South Island Main Trunk Railway 
(SIMTR) were severely damaged by 'high intensity rainfalls resulting from the 
passage of Cyclone Alison' (Bell, 1976:189). State Highway 1 and the SIMTR were 
both closed by 'numerous landslides, flood debris, and washouts' (Bell, 1976:189). 
In some places, the railway swung freely above 18 feet deep washouts 150 feet long, 
while at Waipapa Bay the line was pushed 20 yards out of alignment by slips and 
floodwater (Anon., 1975a). Heavy rainfall caused extensive debris flows within the 
steep coastal catchments (Bell, 1994). Debris blockages in some streams between 
the Hapuku River and the Clarence River diverted flows and caused extensive 
erosion and undermining of the road network (Bell, 1976). Many culverts simply 
proved inadequate to pass the large quantity of water and debris delivered (ibid). 
For example, State Highway 1 was severed north of Kaikoura at Ohau Stream as a 
result of rapid stream aggradation and erosion (see Photo 3.1). Grocott (1977) 
estimated that damage to road and rail infrastructure amounted to $1.75 million. 
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Photo 3.1: Damage to State Highway 1 at Ohau Stream following Cyclone Alison, 
1975 
Source: Barker (199~) 
The extent of damage from Cyclone Alison is best described by Barker (1975): 
'In the last 9 months, State Highway 1 in the Kaikoura area has been subjected to 
damage from heavy seas on two occasions and damage from three floods. However, 
the flood on the 12 March 1975 is the worst in my experience in the District. 
Torrential rain in the wake of Cyclone Alison wrought tremendous havoc along the 
East Coast north and south of Kaikoura from Kekerengu to the Conway River. 
State Highway 1 was closed at 5.30pm on March 12 when the Shingle Fans broke 
out of their channels north of the Clarence River. From then on, things became 
uncontrollable. The worst hit areas were between: 
• Okiwi Bay and Mangamaunu; and 
• the Kahutara River and Oaro River bridge. 
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Unbelievable damage was caused over these sections, especially when coastal 
streams became raging torrents, overwhelming railway and highway bridges. Huge 
landslides buried the highway and railway. ' 
North of Kaikoura, gravel covered both the railway and highway to depths in excess 
of5 metres (Bell, 1975) (see Photo 3.2). 
Photo 3.2: Debris flow aggradation along State Highway I following Cyclone 
Alison, 1975 
Source: Barker (1999) 
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South of Kaikoura, major flood damage occurred in the Hundalee Hills (see Photo 
3.3 and Photo 3.4). Instability problems resulted from combinations of mass 
movements within steep catchments, rapid stream aggradation, scouring around 
blocked culverts and active undercutting by the major streams (Bowring et aI., 1978). 
Photo 3.3: Mass movement and highway instability following Cyclone Alison, 1975 
Photo 3.4: Major slip on State Highway 1 following Cyclone Alison, 1975 
Source: Barker (1999) 
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The community of Kaikoura was isolated for two days following the Cyclone Alison 
event because Highway 70 was also closed. However, damage to Highway 70 was 
not great and this link was reopened on March 14 (Barker, 1975), allowing 
foodstuffs to be brought into Kaikoura, as described by Anon. (1975b:l): 
'Kaikoura ran out of butter on Friday but a truck with about one ton and a quarter 
of butter and other food was sent from Blenheim via the Lewis Pass and the Inland 
Road. The town's milk is also normally delivered from Blenheim, but the Milk 
Board arranged a supply to be delivered from Christchurch. ' 
South of Kaikoura, State Highway 1 was opened on March 20 after a bailey bridge 
was erected in the Hundalee Hills (Barker, 1975). North of Kaikoura, State 
Highway 1 was opened on March 24, although repairs were not complete (ibid). 
Rail traffic was operational on March 25 (Bell, 1976). 
Few vehicles used Highway 70 while restoration works were being carried out, 
which adversely effected local businesses in Kaikoura, as described by Anon. 
(1975c:l): 
'Most restaurants have been either closed or working restricted hours and other 
businesses are well down in their turnover. However, accommodation services have 
not been affected owing to the influx of workmen brought in to repair damage to 
road and rail services. ' 
The major conclusion from post-Cyclone Alison investigations was that 'future 
damage from such hazards can be minimised, but not prevented' (Bell, 1976:197). 
Landslide damage during major rainstorm events can be expected to recur every ten 
to twenty years (Bell, 1994). 
3.5.2 Earthquake-induced landslides 
Since 1840, at least twenty-two earthquakes in New Zealand have resulted in 
widespread and damaging landsliding (Hancox et aI., 1998). For example, 'the 1929 
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Murchison earthquake (Magnitude 7.8) triggered countless small slips and at least 
fifty landslides' (McSaveney and McSaveney, 1998:80). The community of 
Karamea was isolated by road for several months because of the extent of damage to 
the road network (ibid). In Canterbury, earthquake generated slope failures 'must be 
anticipated from any moderate to large seismic event which produces ground 
shaking intensities of MM6 or greater' (Bell, 1994:63). As described in section 3.6, 
the Kaikoura District is vulnerable to earthquakes of this magnitude. 
During past earthquakes, landslides occur mostly 'on slopes of twenty degrees or 
more, with the most common failures being rock and soil falls on cliffs, steep 
escarpments and high unsupported man-made cuts' (Hancox et aI., 1998:207). The 
National Water and Soil Conservation Organisation (1978) classifies much of the 
area north of Kaikoura between the Hapuku River and the Clarence River and south 
of Kaikoura between the J(ahutara River and Oaro as steep to very steep eroded hills 
and cliffs with slopes steeper than twenty-one degrees. Most areas have moderate to 
severe slip potential (ibid). It is reasonable to assume that the slope failure hazard 
throughout the mountainous sections of State Highway 1 may be acute during the 
next major earthquake, particularly where faults cross the road corridor (see section 
3.6). The Centre for Advanced Engineering (1997), for example, believe that 
following a major earthquake, damage from slips on State Highway 1 in the 
Kaikoura District could close the highway for up to three weeks. 
The type of instability problems which may result from an earthquake in the 
Kaikoura District are highlighted by the June 23, 1992 Punchbowl Comer closure, 
12km south of Kaikoura. State Highway 1 was closed for a thirteen-day period after 
the rock face adjacent to the highway was declared to be unsafe (Hide, 1992a). 
Geologists believed that a minor earthquake might have contributed to the loosening 
of the rock face (ibid). While remedial works were being carried out, road-users 
detoured to Highway 70. However, on June 30 Highway 70 was also closed because 
of ice. Highway 70 became impassable after a heavy frost turned mud to sheet ice 
on unsealed sections (Hide, 1992b). 
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The Chairman of the Kaikoura Information and Tourism Council reported that the 
drop-off in tourism was seriously affecting Kaikoura (Hide, 1992c). As one 
Kaikoura motelier stated: 
'This time of year is our quieter time and with this on top of it is quite a blow. There 
are parking spaces galore in the township. It is quite dead' (Hide, 1992c:l). 
In the Kaikoura District, road network security is also threatened by the damming of 
rivers. During large earthquakes, many rivers are susceptible to damming by 
landslides, and consequential flooding when the dam bursts (McSaveney, 1995). 
Following damming (and later flooding) of the Clarence River, Hapuku River or 
Kowhai River, the road network in the District may be severed. No feasible 
mitigation measures are practicable for this type of hazard (ibid). 
3.5.3 Slow moving landslides 
Slow moving landslides may also disrupt the road network in the Kaikoura District. 
For example,' a 'zone of a kilometre or more of unstable ground occurs in the vicinity 
of the Blue Slip' (Opus, 1999:14) (see Figure 3.1). Movement does not appear to be 
directly related to storm events, but is a result of a slow mass movement process 
(Bowring et al., ·1978). The Blue Slip is known to 'lift' the highway (eg. in March 
1980 an 80 metre length of highway was uplifted), which may close the highway for 
a period of 24 hours (Sutton, pers. com.). 
3.6 Earthquake hazard 
New Zealand is situated between two major tectonic plates and on average, has 
17,000 earthquakes each year, six of them greater than Magnitude 6.0 (Hull, 1998). 
'The historical and geological record in Canterbury clearly indicates that many 
active faults within the region are capable of generating earthquakes with 
Magnitudes greater than 6.0' (Cowan et al., 1994:85). The major fault systems that 
may be a source of network disruption in the Kaikoura District are the Alpine Fault 
and the Marlborough Fault system. 
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3.6.1 The Alpine Fault 
The Alpine Fault passes through the Southern Alps and there is 'a greater than 50 
per cent probability that it will cause a Magnitude 8.0 earthquake within the next 
fifty years' (McSaveney and Davies, 1998:75). 'Strong to moderate shaking will 
occur in most South Island locations within 150km of the Alpine Fault which will 
trigger landslides over a very large area, particularly in the Southern Alps and on 
nearby slopes' (Yetton et aI., 1998: 134). It is reasonable to assume that the road 
network in the Kaikoura District may be damaged by landslide hazards following 
rupture of the Alpine Fault because of the mountainous (and unstable) terrain in the 
Kaikoura District. 
. 3.6.2 Marlborough Fault system 
In the Kaikoura District, there are several active faults. These include the: 
• Hope Fault - runs parallel to Highway 70 along the base of the Seaward Kaikoura 
Range. The northerly continuation of the Hope Fault reaches the coast at Ohau 
Point (see Figure 3.1). 
• Clarence Fault - runs along the Clarence River Valley from near the coast south 
towards the main Alpine Fault. 
• Fidget Fault - splays off the Kekerengu Fault and Jordan Thrust Fault near the 
Clarence River. 
• Jordan Thrust Fault - runs along the Seaward Kaikoura Range. 
• Kekerengu Fault - connects to the Fidget and Jordan Thrust Faults in the Seaward 
Kaikoura Range and runs towards the Kekerengu River mouth. Traces of the 
Kekerengu Fault cross the coast some 3km north of the Blue Slip (Bell, 1975; 
Cowan et aI., 1994; Kaikoura District Council, 1998; and Van Dissen, 1991). 
Current understanding of faults in the District suggest that damage to State Highway 
1 and Highway 70 could be particularly severe following either direct rupture of the 
Hope Fault or Kekerengu Fault (where these faults cross the road-rail corridor), or 
following an earthquake on other nearby faults (McMorran, 1995). Significant 
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damage must be anticipated in the Kaikoura District from these sources (Cowan et 
aI., 1994), which could include distortion of the highway and surface breaks (Opus, 
1999). 
Based on limited infonnation, McMorran (1995) believes that the Hikurangi 
Subduction Zone (HSV) (a trench located off the east coast where the Pacific plate 
dips underneath the North Island) may constitute the greatest seismic hazard in the 
Kaikoura District. Rupture of this fault, or other faults in the District, may result in 
shaking intensities of up to MM9 in Kaikoura township (ibid). There is a 10 per cent 
probability of exceeding MM9 in any fifty-year period (ibid). 
3.7 Conclusion 
State Highway 1 is vulnerable to closure from landward hazards, seaward hazards, or 
from both sources simultaneou'sly (Kirk, 1985). Highway 70 is also subject to 
closure from a host of natural hazards, particularly from flood damage. Heavy 
rainfall (and associated flooding and slope movements) has been the predominant 
cause of road network disruption in the Kaikoura District. Simultaneous linkage 
closures have also occurred in the District because of the geographic coverage of 
heavy rainfall events. Since June, 1995 the road network in the Kaikoura District 
has been quite secure. However, the historical record clearly· indicates that 
dislocation of one link (or all links simultaneously) may occur in the future. 
Extended dislocation of links may occur from rain-induced events, or from a host of 
other hazards, including potentially 'catastrophic' and poorly understood hazards 
such as powerful earthquakes and tsunami. 
The following chapter estimates the additional costs incurred by road-users as a 
result of road closure events in the Kaikoura District. 
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Chapter 4: Road-user cost assessment 
4.1 Introduction 
Additional costs (time costs, vehicle operating costs and accident costs) incurred by 
road-users as a result of road closure events in the Kaikoura District are estimated in 
the following chapter. The road-user cost methodology is also described. The 
following section describes the road network servicing Kaikoura. 
4.2 Road network overview 
The road network servicing Kaikoura (including alternative links) is shown in Figure 
4.1. The focus of this chapter is the potential costs of closure incurred by road-users 
when theWaipara to Kaikoura link (State Highway 1 to the south of Kaikoura) or 
the Kaikoura to Blenheim link (State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura) are closed 
by natural hazards. 
In the event of closure, the alternative routes are: 
• Highway 70 (Inland Road) - provides an alternative route between Christchurch 
and Picton (and Kaikoura) if State Highway 1 to the south of Kaikoura is closed. 
This route includes the nodes of Christchurch, Waipara, Culverden, Kaikoura, 
Blenheim and Picton. In the Hurunui District, approximately lOkm of this route 
is unsealed, although the highway will be completely sealed within a year 
(Whyte, pers. com.) . 
• Lewis Pass - provides an additional route between Christchurch and Picton (and 
Kaikoura) if State Highway 1 and Highway 70 to the south of Kaikoura are closed 
or State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is closed. This route includes the 
nodes of Christchurch, Waipara, Culverden, Hanmer Junction, Springs Junction, 
Murchison, Rainbow Junction, Blenheim, Picton (and Kaikoura). 
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Figure 4.1: Detours due to road closures 
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In addition, two 'possible' routes are: 
• Rainbow route - could be used as an 'emergency' alternative instead of the Lewis 
Pass route. This route includes the nodes of Christchurch, Waipara, Culverden, 
Hanmer Junction, Hanmer Springs, Rainbow Junction, Blenheim, Picton (and 
Kaikoura). Between Hanmer Springs and Rainbow Junction the Rainbow route is 
unsealed (103km) and is recommended for use by four-wheel drive vehicles 
because it crosses many unbridged streams and is narrow in places (Department 
of Conservation, 1996). Conversations with the Department of Conservation 
indicate that the link conditions a trip time of approximately three hours and can 
be completed by cars, but is unsuitable for use by other vehicle classes. The 
Rainbow link is vulnerable to closure from natural hazards, particularly heavy 
snowfall (ibid) . 
• Molesworth route - could also be used as an 'emergency' alternative instead of 
the Lewis Pass route. This route includes the nodes of Christchurch, Waipara, 
Culverden, Hanmer Junction, Hanmer Springs, Blenheim, Picton (and Kaikoura). 
Between Hanmer Springs and the Molesworth route turnoff west of State 
Highway 1 (22km south of Blenheim) the Molesworth route is unsealed (176km) 
and conditions a trip time of approximately five hours. Conversations with the 
Department of Conservation indicate that the link is used by heavy commercial 
vehicles to transport cattle, although the route is narrow and passes through 
difficult terrain not favourable for trucking use. The Molesworth link is also 
prone to closure from natural hazards. 
Both 'possible' routes have various limitations, including operational difficulties that 
would need to be overcome because both routes pass through private land. 
However, cost estimates are included to provide insights into 'potential' cost 
structures compared to existing alternatives. 
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4.3 Road-user cost assessment methodology 
Travel time costs and vehicle operating costs (VOC) combined were estimated for 
each vehicle trip for each link in the road network. Costs were estimated for each of 
the six vehicle classes (defined in Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Description of the six vehicle classes 
Vehicle class Vehicle class composition 
Passenger cars cars and station wagons, with a wheelbase of 3.0 
metres or less 
Light Commercial Vehicles vans, utilities and light trucks up to 3.5 tonnes 
(LCV) gross laden weight 
Medium Commercial Vehicle two axle heavy trucks without a trailer, over 3.5 
(MCV) tonnes gross laden weight 
Heavy Commercial Vehicle I rigid trucks with or without trailers or articulated 
(HCVI) vehicle with three or four axles in total 
Heavy Commercial Vehicle II trucks and trailers and articulated vehicles with or 
(HCVII) without trailers with five or more axles in total 
Buses buses, excluding minibuses 
Source: Transfund NZ (1997a:A2-1) 
Accident costs were also estimated for each vehicle trip for each link in the network. 
However, it was not possible to calculate accident costs for individual vehicle 
classes. 
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4.3.1 Assigning time costs and VOC (per vehicle trip) for each link in the network 
Transfund NZ (1997a) composite time costs (which include occupant time, vehicle 
time and freight time) for roads designated Rural Other are $20.80 per vehicle per 
hour for standard traffic mixes (for all periods). However, State Highway 1 typically 
has a higher percentage of HCV than standard, so travel time costs for Rural 
Strategic Roads ($21.60) have been used to approximate the costs incurred by this 
mix of vehicles (Harris Consulting, 1997). 
Travel times for each link are based on those reported in Transit NZ (1998e). 
However, based on HCV travel times associated with the Clifford Bay project, it is 
assumed that HCV incur an additional 18 per cent travel time (Kerr, pers. com.). 
VOC (along rural highways) for each vehicle class were derived from Transfund NZ 
(1997a). Changes in voe are dependent on speed and gradient. Following Harris 
Consulting (1997), link distances were divided by link travel times to derive average 
speeds for each link in the road network. Average speed information was used in 
conjunction with highway gradient information to assign VOC along each road link. 
Highway gradients were estimated from topographic maps and highway information 
sheets. Mean uphill and downhill VOC (cents/km) for various gradients were 
multiplied by the length of 'sloping' highway (km) to derive voe through 
rolling/mountainous terrain. Total VOC along each link were obtained by 
combining VOC through rolling/mountainous terrain with voe through flat terrain 
(0 per cent gradient). 
Road roughness costs were included as additional VOe. Using the roughness count 
figures suggested by Harris Consulting (1997), unsealed roads were assumed to be 
200 NAASRA counts. However, roughness counts on unsealed roads can vary 
significantly, depending on factors such as weather conditions and frequency of 
grading (Whyte, pers. com.). Costs are, therefore, approximate and subject to 
variation. Sealed highways were assumed to be 70 NAASRA counts (Harris 
Consulting, 1997). 
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For ease of interpretation, a worked example for the Christchurch to Waipara link is 
provided below. The information required to assign time costs and VOC (per 
vehicle) is shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Information required to assign time costs and VOC (per vehicle) for the 
Christchurch to Waipara link 
Link distance Time of travel Time of travel 
(Cars, LCV, MCV, Buses) (HCV) 
57km (sealed) 55 minutes 64.9 minutes 
(average speed of 62km/hr) (average speed of 53kmlhr) 
. Using this information, Table 4.3 shows the time cost and VOC calculations 
(including roughness costs) for the six vehicle classes. 
Table 4.3: Assigning time costs and VOC (per vehicle trip) for the Christchurch to 
Waipara link (assuming flat terrain) 
<X. A B C D E 
Vehicle Time of Time Total time VOC Total VOC Total 
class travel cost cost (cents/km) (C*57km) cost 
(mins) ($Ihr) (A*al60) (B+D) 
cars 55 $21.60 $19.80 27.57 $15.72 $35.52 
LCV 55 $21.60 $19.80 22.53 $12.84 $32.64 
MCV 55 $21.60 $19.80 40.81 $23.26 $43.06 
HCVI 64.9 $21.60 $23.36 51.11 $29.13 $52.49 
HCVII 64.9 $21.60 $23.36 58.23 $33.19 $56.55 
Buses 55 $21.60 $19.80 57.54 $32.80 $52.60 
The per vehicle cost estimates for each link were incorporated into the State 
Highway network model. The model calculated the cost of travel for each vehicle 
class between different nodes in the network. 
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4.3.2 Assigning accident costs (per vehicle trip) for each link in the network 
Accident histories for each link in the road network for the 1994 to 1998 period were 
obtained from the Land Transport Safety Authority accident database (LTSA, 1999). 
Accident histories were then incorporated into the Transfund NZ Accident Analysis 
Programme (Transfund NZ, 1997b). The programm~ calculated annual accident 
costs. Annual accident costs were divided by annual vehicle numbers obtained from 
Transit NZ (Chesterfield, pers. com. and Harcourt, pers. com.) to provide per vehicle 
accident costs. However, cost estimates are conservative because intersection 
accidents (with an estimated cost of $2,659,148 per year) and non-injury accidents 
are not included in the analysis. 
For ease of interpretation, a worked example for the Springs Junction to Murchison 
link is provided below (see Table 4A). 
Table 4.4: Assigning accident costs (per vehicle) for the Springs Junction to 
Murchison link 
A B C 
Road segment Accident Annual Annual Cost per 
history accident cost vehicle vehicle (AlB) 
1994-1998 numbers 
Springs Junction to o fatal $2,064,356 273,750 $7.54 
SH6 intersection 6 serious 
31 minor 
SH6 intersection to o fatal $445,486 562,465 $0.79 
Murchison 2 serious 
2 minor 
Table 4.4 shows that the mean accident cost (per vehicle) between Springs Junction 
and Murchison is $8.33. 
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The per vehicle accident costs for each link were incorporated into the State 
Highway network model. The model calculated accident costs between different 
nodes in the network. 
4.3.3 Estimating the daily cost of road closure events 
To estimate the daily cost of road closure, the additional per vehicle costs (time 
costs, VOC and accident costs) incurred along the alternative routes were multiplied 
by the number of vehicles expected to be affected by road closure events. The 
number of vehicles expected to be affected by closure events was estimated from 
AADT information provided by Transit NZ (Harcourt, pers. com.) (see Table 4.5) . 
. Table 4.5: Daily vehicle numbers expected to be affected by the closure of State 
Highway 1 in the Kaikoura District 
AADT 
Vehicle type SHI north of Kaikoura SHI south of Kaikoura 
Cars 1304 1520 
LCV 302 192 
MCV 76 76 
HCVI 57 94 
HCVII 132 96 
Buses 19 22 
Total 1890 2000 
However, it was not accurately known where vehicles in the Kaikoura District were 
travelling to or from or how traffic movement would change following disruption, 
both of which influence the magnitude of daily cost estimates. Various assumptions 
were made to address this uncertainty (see below). Accordingly, daily cost estimates 
are approximate and subject to error. 
State Highway 1 is the South Island's main north/south route and provides an 
important link (particularly for freight flows) between Christchurch and 
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BlenheimlPicton (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997). It is assumed that the 
majority of vehicles using State Highway 1 in the Kaikoura District are travelling 
between Christchurch and BlenheimlPicton (the largest centres in the network under 
consideration) and a minority of vehicles travel from these larger centres to 
Kaikoura. These assumptions are supported by comments made by Harcourt (pers. 
com.) suggesting that Christchurch, Blenheim and Picton (and Kaikoura to a lesser 
extent) are key origin and destination points. Many road-users are, however, likely to 
be travelling between other origins and destinations (eg. between local centres in 
close proximity) and would incur different costs to those assumed above. However, 
the inclusion of all 'possible' vehicle movements in the cost analysis is too complex. 
Accordingly, ten per cent of vehicles shown in Table 4.5 were excluded from the 
cost analysis. This exclusion is likely to result in an under-estimate of road-user 
. costs because the additional costs incurred by 10 per cent of vehicles from link 
closure are not captured in the analysis. 
For vehicle movements included in the analysis, it is assumed that: 
'Best' estimate: 80 per cent of cars, LCV and MCV and 95 per cent of HCV and 
buses are travelling between Christchurch and BlenheimlPicton, independently of 
Kaikoura as a destination. It is assumed that all other vehicles travel to Kaikoura 
(from Christchurch or from BlenheimlPicton). 
However, because the 'best' vehicle movement assumptions are not precise, 
alternative assumptions were made to see how road-user costs change (see section 
4.3.4). 
Assumptions were also made about changes in traffic movement following closure 
events. Vehicles may delay, detour or cancel their trip. For the purposes of this 
research, road-users are assumed to either detour or cancel their trip based on prior 
knowledge of link availability. The exclusion of delay costs is likely to result in an 
under-estimate of road-user costs because of link closure. 
To estimate the number of car-users who may cancel their trips when State Highway 
73 is closed, Butcher (1985a) used a demand elasticity value for car travel of 0.34. 
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This demand elasticity value was derived from traffic count information collected by 
former Ministry of Works and Development staff during a State Highway 6 closure 
event (ibid). An alternative route to State Highway 6 via Reefton was available and 
traffic counters recorded the number of cars detouring, which allowed demand 
elasticities to be calculated (ibid). MUltiplying the demand elasticity value for car 
travel by the percentage cost increase of the alternative route yields the percentage of 
car-users who may cancel their trip. Cars travelling between Christchurch and Picton 
via the Lewis Pass, for example, incur a 45 per cent cost increase. The 45 per cent 
cost increase multiplied by the demand elasticity value of 0.34 equates to 15 per cent 
of car-users cancelling their trip. For the various route alternatives, the percentage 
of car-users expected to cancel was calculated using the elasticity value of 0.34. The 
percentage of LCV expected to cancel was estimated using the same elasticity value 
because it is assumed that some LCV (eg. vans and utilities) also have flexible 
transport schedules. 
Following Butcher (1985a), it was assumed that all commercial vehicles, other than 
LeV, would detour to alternative routes in the event of State Highway 1 closure 
because of freight and passenger commitments. However, conversations with freight 
transport companies based in Kaikoura and bus operators contacted by phone 
suggested that vehicles originating from or destined for Kaikoura would be unlikely 
to continue regular services if vehicles were required to use the Lewis Pass route. If, 
for example, State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is closed, operators would be 
unlikely to continue regular Kaikoura to BlenheimlPicton services by detouring to 
the Lewis Pass route. Accordingly, all commercial vehicles, other than LCV, 
originating from, or destined for Kaikoura were assumed to cancel trips if required to 
detour to the Lewis Pass route. 
For all road-users who cancel trips, costs are also incurred. Following Butcher 
(1985a), the loss of benefits is assumed to be half the cost of detouring (excluding 
accident costs). However, because the cancellation assumptions are not precise, 
alternative assumptions were made to see how road-user costs change (see section 
4.3.4). 
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For ease of interpretation, a worked example of calculating daily disruption costs 
(either because of detour or cancellation) when the Kaikoura to Blenheim link is 
closed is provided as Appendix 2 (assuming vehicle movements are the same as 
those outlined in the 'best' estimate). 
4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
The 'best' daily closure cost estimate outlined above is subject to much uncertainty, 
particularly when road-users are required to detour to the Lewis Pass route. 
Accordingly, a range of different assumptions were made to determine how daily 
road-user costs differ to the 'best' estimate. 
The alternative assumptions made for pre-disruption vehicle movements are: 
'High' estimate: 70 per cent of cars, LCV and MCV and 85 per cent of HCV and 
buses are travelling between Christchurch and BlenheimIPicton, independently of 
Kaikoura as a destination. It is assumed that all other vehicles travel to Kaikoura 
(from Christchurch or from BlenheimlPicton). The 'high' estimate assumes that a 
higher percentage of vehicles travel to Kaikoura and a lower percentage of vehicles 
travel between Christchurch and BlenheimlPicton than the 'best' estimate. 
'Low' estimate: 90 per cent of cars, LCV and MCV and 100 per cent of HCV and 
buses are travelling between Christchurch and BlenheimIPicton, independently of 
Kaikoura as a destination. It is assumed that all other vehicles travel to Kaikoura 
(from Christchurch or from BlenheimIPicton). The 'low' estimate assumes that a 
lower percentage of vehicles travel to Kaikoura and a higher percentage of vehicles 
travel between Christchurch and BlenheimIPicton than the 'best' estimate. 
Alternative assumptions were also made about the number of road-users that may 
cancel their trip in the event of link closure. In addition to the cancellation 
assumptions made in section 4.3.3, costs are estimated when all vehicles are assumed 
to detour to alternative routes (ie. no cancellations) for the 'best', 'high', and 'low' 
vehicle movement estimates. 
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The sensitivity analysis allows a range of 'possible' daily road-user costs to be 
presented. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) via route alternatives 
The additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) between the nodes of 
Christchurch and Kaikoura when State Highway 1 is closed south of Kaikoura or 
Highway 70 and State Highway 1 are closed south of Kaikoura are shown in Table 
4.6. 
Table 4.6: Additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) between 
Christchurch and Kaikoura via the route alternatives 
Existing routes Possible routes 
Item Highway 70 Lewis Rainbow Molesworth 
Pass route route 
Additional length (km) 19 411 280 231 
Additional time* (mins) 50 390 330 340 
Distance unsealed (km) 10 - 103 176 
Additional time and 
VOCfor: 
cars $24.91 $254.32 $210.68 $210.89 
LCV $23.46 $234.01 ($196.61) $199.31 
MCV $27.98 $313.49 ($261.21) $283.09 
HCVI $36.62 $387.58 ($344.85) $366.20 
HCVII $38.11 $430.64 ($368.29) ($386.79) 
Buses $30.36 $384.98 ($302.70) $291.54 
Additional accident cost -$3.22 $67.74 Not estim. Notestim. 
* It is assumed that Hev incur an additional 18 per cent travel time than times indicated. 
Vehicles that are unlikely to be able to use 'possible' routes. 
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When State Highway 1 is closed south of Kaikoura, Highway 70 requires an 
additional 19km (50 minutes) travel and conditions moderate time cost and voe 
increases (between $23 and $38 per trip). However, accident costs on Highway 70 
are $3.22 less per vehicle than on State Highway 1 because a relatively high number 
of accidents have occurred on State Highway 1 between the Kowhai River and the 
Waiau River (9 fatal, 29 serious, 68 minor) between 1994 and 1998. 
When both southern links providing access to Kaikoura are closed, the Lewis Pass 
route conditions significant time costs and voe (an additional $234 to $430 per 
trip). Hev incur the greatest cost increases. Additional accident costs are also 
significant, which is largely attributable to the mountainous State Highway 7 stretch. 
Both 'possible' routes are more direct than the Lewis Pass route. However, the 
unfavourable terrain of both 'possible' routes conditions trip times that are only 50 
minutes to 60 minutes quicker than the Lewis Pass route. Both 'possible' routes 
provide lower cost alternatives than the Lewis Pass route. If, for example, cars used 
the Rainbow route, time costs and voe would be $43 less per vehicle than the 
Lewis Pass route. The Molesworth route could cater for other vehicle classes than 
the Rainbow route and provide lower cost travel than the Lewis Pass route (up to 
$93 less per trip). However, HeVI would only save $21 per trip by using the 
Molesworth route instead of the Lewis Pass route, primarily because roughness costs 
for Hev are more than $0.50 per km. 
The additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) between the nodes of 
BlenheimlPicton and Kaikoura when State Highway 1 is closed north of Kaikoura 
are shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) between 
BlenheimIPicton and Kaikoura via the route alternatives 
EXisting route Possible routes 
Item Lewis Pass Rainbow route Molesworth route 
Additional length (Ian) 348 217 212 
Additional time* (mins) 370 310 360 
Distance unsealed (Ian) - 113 186 
Additional time and 
VOCfor: 
cars $231.51 $187.87 $214.62 
LCV $213.67 ($176.57) $203.35 
MeV $282.51 ($230.23) $284.79 
HCVI $352.56 ($309.83) $371.30 
HCVII $391.39 ($329.04) ($391.58) 
Buses $342.60 ($260.32) $289.36 
Additional accident cost $59.16 Not estim. Not estim. 
* It is assumed that HeV incur an additional 18 per cent travel time than times indicated. 
Vehicles that are unlikely to be able to use 'possible' routes. 
When State Highway 1 is closed north of Kaikoura, the only existing alternative, via 
the Lewis Pass, conditions significant distance, time and cost increases. Additional 
time costs and VOC are between $213 and $391 per trip. Additional accident costs 
are also high ($59.16 per trip). 
Again, the Rainbow route would provide a lower cost alternative for cars than the 
Lewis Pass route. The Molesworth route only provides a lower cost alternative for 
cars, LCV and buses compared to the Lewis Pass route. 
The additional distance, time and cost of travel between Christchurch and 
BlenheimIPicton (independently of Kaikoura as an origin or destination) when both 
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links are closed south of Kaikoura and/or State Highway 1 is closed north of 
Kaikoura are shown in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Additional distance, time and cost of travel (per vehicle) between 
Christchurch and BlenheimlPicton via the route alternatives 
Existing route Possible routes 
Item Lewis Pass Rainbow route Molesworth route 
Additional length (km) 147 16 11 
Additional time* (mins) 150 90 140 
Distance unsealed (km) - 103 176 
Additional time and 
VOCfor: 
cars $95.08 $51.44 $78.19 
LCV $87.71 ($50.61) $77.39 
MCV $117.35 ($65.07) $119.63 
HCVI $146.86 ($104.13) $165.60 
HCVII $166.38 ($104.03) ($166.57) 
Buses $143.74 ($61.46) $90.50 
Additional accident cost $30.76 Not estim. Not estim. 
* It is assumed that HeV incur an additional 18 per cent travel time than times indicated. 
Vehicles that are unlikely to be able to use 'possible' routes. 
The Lewis Pass route requires an additional 147km travel than the preferred State 
Highway 1 route. The additional 150 minute travel time via the Lewis Pass route is 
likely to be problematic for commercial vehicle operators on return trips (eg. shuttle 
buses) because of driving hours regulations. Law permits a maximum of 11 hours 
driving time per day. Return trips via the Lewis Pass route exceed permitted 
regulations. Some commercial operators may, therefore, incur other additional costs 
(eg. accommodation costs). 
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When road-users are required to use the Lewis Pass route, road-users incur 
additional time costs and VOC of $87 to $166 per trip than the preferred State 
Highway 1 route. Additional accident costs are also high ($30 per trip). 
If all vehicle classes could use the Rainbow route, road-users would incur time costs 
and VOC of between $37 and $82 less than the Lewis Pass route. Again, if the 
Molesworth route were available for use, only cars, LCV and buses would incur 
lower costs compared to the Lewis Pass route. 
4.4.2 Daily cost of road closure events 
The daily cost of road closure events is presented in the following section. Costs are 
based on the 'best' vehicle movement estimate and assume that some road-users 
cancel their trip because of the cost increases incurred along the route alternatives 
(see section 4.3.3 for a,description of the assumptions used to derive cost estimates). 
Closure of State Highway 1 north of Kaikoura 
There is currently an average of 1890 vehicles per day using the Kaikoura to 
Blenheim link. However, when the Kaikoura to Blenheim link is closed, additional 
road-user costs are estimated for only 90 per cent of these vehicles (1701 vehicles 
per day) to account for vehicle movements outside the scope of the analysis (eg. 
local vehicle movements). The additional daily costs incurred by road-users via the 
Lewis Pass route (either because of detour or cancellation) are shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Additional costs incurred by road-users (per day) when State Highway 1 
is closed north of Kaikoura 
Lewis Pass 
Detour and cancellation costs* 
Additional time costs and VOC $177,153 
Additional accident costs $40,242 
Total additional costs $217,395 
* A worked example of this cost estimate is provided as Appendix 2. 
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A 13-day closure north of Kaikoura would, for example, condition additional road-
user costs of $2.83 million ($217,395*13). 
Closure of State Highway 1 and Highway 70 south of Kaikoura 
There is currently an average of 2000 vehicles per day using the Waipara to 
Kaikoura link. However, when the Waipara to Kaikoura link is closed, additional 
road-user costs are estimated for only 90 per cent of these vehicles (1800 vehicles 
per day) to account for vehicle movements outside the scope of the analysis (eg. 
local vehicle movements). The additional costs incurred by road-users via the Lewis 
Pass route (either because of detour or cancellation) are shown in Table 4.10. 
Highway 70 traffic volumes are not considered in the analysis. The exclusion of 
. Highway 70 vehicle numbers results in conservative cost estimates of link closure. 
Table 4.10: Additional costs incurred by road-users (per day) when both links south 
of Kaikoura are closed 
Lewis Pass 
Detour and cancellation costs 
Additional time costs and VOC $194,671 
Additional accident costs $44,681 
Total additional costs $239,352 
A 13-day closure of both links south of Kaikoura would, for example, condition 
additional road-user costs of $3.11 million ($239,352*13). 
Closure of State Highway 1 south of Kaikoura 
There is currently an average of 2000 vehicles per day using the Waipara to 
Kaikoura link. However, when the Waipara to Kaikoura link is closed, additional 
road-user costs are estimated for only 90 per cent of these vehicles (1800 vehicles 
per day) to account for vehicle movements outside the scope of the analysis (eg. 
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local vehicle movements). The additional costs incurred by road-users via Highway 
70 (either because of detour or cancellation) are shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: Additional costs incurred by road-users (per day) when State Highway 1 
is closed south of Kaikoura 
Highway 70 
Detour and cancellation costs 
Additional time costs and VOC $46,156 
Additional accident costs -$5,567 
Total additional costs $40,589 
. A 13-day closure of State Highway 1 south of Kaikoura would, for example, 
condition additional road:-user costs of $0.53 million ($40,589*13). 
4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Different assumptions about the percentage of vehicles travelling between nodes and 
the percentage of road-users cancelling trips were made to allow a range of 
'possible' daily closure costs to be presented (see section 4.3.4 for a description of 
the different assumptions). A range of 'possible' daily costs are presented in Table 
4.12 when State Highway 1 is closed north of Kaikoura or both links south of 
Kaikoura are closed and vehicles detour to the Lewis Pass route. A range of 
'possible' costs is not included for the Highway 70 alternative because 'possible' 
costs show little (or no) variation under different assumptions (eg. if all road-users 
are assumed to detour to Highway 70 the cost for the 'low', 'medium' and 'best' 
estimate is $41,239, only $650 more than the estimate provided in Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.12: Total additional road-user costs incurred (per day) under alternative 
assumptions 
Lewis Pass 
'Low' 'Best' 'High' 
estimate estimate estimate 
Detour and $213,092 $217,395 $221,853 
SHI North cancellation cost 
CLOSED All detour cost $250,324 $277,747 $307,181 
Detour and $229,639 $239,352 $249,078 
SHI and H70 South cancellation cost 
CLOSED All detour cost $269,888 $304,294 $341,262 
When a higher percentage of road-users travel to Kaikoura and a lower percentage of 
road-users travel between Christchurch and BlenheimlPicton (ie. the 'high' 
estimate), total additional road-user costs are higher than the 'best' estimate. This 
may be attributed to the 'backtracking' required to access Kaikoura via the Lewis 
Pass route. When a lower percentage of road-users travel to Kaikoura and a higher 
percentage of road-users travel between Christchurch and the north of the South 
Island (ie. the 'low' estimate), total additional road-user costs are lower than the 
'best' estimate. 
The greatest differences in costs are, however, seen when all road-users are assumed 
to detour during closure events (ie. no cancellations). For example, when a high 
percentage of road-users are assumed to travel to Kaikoura (ie. the 'high' estimate) 
and no road-users cancel their trip, additional road-user costs exceed $300,000 per 
day. However, because the cost increases incurred by road-users via the Lewis Pass 
route are substantial, it is likely that some road-users would cancel their trip when 
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State Highway 1 is closed. Therefore, it is assumed that the detour and cancellation 
cost estimates are most feasible (see shaded boxes in Table 4.12). 
4.5 Conclusion 
The road network in the Kaikoura District is sparse. There is only one alternative 
route (Highway 70) available in the Kaikoura District when State Highway 1 is 
closed south of Kaikoura. There is no alternative route in the Kaikoura District for 
State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura. Road-users (particularly HeV) incur 
significant costs by detouring to the Lewis Pass route. The Rainbow route would 
provide the lowest cost 'emergency' alternative to the Lewis Pass route. However, if 
the Rainbow route were to be made available to all vehicle classes, significant (and 
costly) link improvement works would be required. 
Additional road~user costs exceed $200,000 per day when State Highway 1 is closed 
and road-users detour to the Lewis Pass route. When an immediate alternative route 
is available (Highway 70), additional daily costs are significantly lower. 
State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is the most important single link in the 
Kaikoura District because no low-cost alternative route is' available. The lack of a 
low-cost alternative route reinforces the importance of retaining (and promptly 
reinstating) the Kaikoura to Blenheim link. State Highway 1 to the south of 
Kaikoura is the second most important link because it is more cost-effective than 
Highway 70. 
The following chapter investigates non-user costs of road network disruption in the 
Kaikoura District. 
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Chapter 5: Non-user cost assessment 
5.1 Introduction 
A survey of businesses in the Kaikoura District was conducted to provide insights 
into non-user costs of road hetwork disruption. This chapter presents the results of 
the survey and describes the methodology applied. The economic structure of the 
Kaikoura District is also presented in the following section. 
5.2 Economic structure of the Kaikoura District 
'At the time of the 1996 census, the Kaikoura District had a usually resident 
population of 3,516 people and the township itself had a usually resident population 
of 2,208 people' (Hom et al., 1998:19). Kaikoura township is the primary 
residential and commercial centre in the Kaikoura District (Canterbury Regional 
Council, 1999). Outside the township, the District is predominantly rural in focus 
(ibid). 
The 1996 census indicated that total employment in the District was approximately 
1,386 full-time equivalent persons (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: The number of persons employed in the Kaikoura District 
Sector 1996 
Agriculture 267 
Restaurant and accommodation 180 
Wholesale and retail trade 150 
All other services 144 
Not identified 138 
Health and education 126 
Construction 81 
All other manufacturing 77 
Fishing 69 
Recreation and culture 60 
Fish processing 42 
Other transport 36 
Business and professional services 21 
Dairy processing 18 
Hunting, forestry and mining 15 
Railways 15 
Communications 6 
Electricity, gas and water 3 
Total 1386 
Source: Butcher et al. (1998:2) 
The major sources of employment in the Kaikoura District are 'agriculture and the 
various service industries (which incorporate the various aspects of tourism)' 
(Butcher et aI., 1998:2). Almost 30 per cent of all jobs in the Kaikoura District 
depend either directly or indirectly on tourist spending (ibid:27). 
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5.3 Non-user cost assessment methodology 
5.3.1 Scenario methods 
Non-user costs of road network disruption in the Kaikoura District were estimated 
using scenario methods. Scenario writing is a technique of futures research that 
provides descriptions of potential events in order to show how, under present 
conditions and assumptions, a future state might evolve (Vlachos, 1981). In this 
research, scenario writing involved painting a picture of what could happen to the 
road network servicing Kaikoura to investigate the degree to which local businesses 
may be disrupted by road closure events (Ericksen, 1990). 
Non-user costs of road network disruption can be assessed by first establishing the 
degree of hazard and then relating the hazard threat to realistic closure scenarios 
(Glade and Crozier, 1996). The historical review of natural hazards formed the basis 
from which the three closure scenarios were created (see Appendix 3). Scenario 1 is 
based on the 1992 Punchbowl Comer closure event. Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are 
based on 'possible' closure events. The 13-day closure durations used in Scenario 2 
and Scenario 3 are based on the most severe closure durations of past events (eg. 
following the 1975 Cyclone Alison event). 
Semi-structured interviews were the preferred research tool because in-depth 
accounts of potential costs, based on the three scenarios presented to respondents, 
were sought. 'Semi-structured interviews are used when some of the flexibility and 
detail of qualitative research is required, in conjunction with the opportunity to 
aggregate answers (the hallmark of quantitative research)' (Morton-Williams, 
1985:28). The methodology used focused on potential turnover losses arising from 
the three closure scenarios presented to respondents. 
The primary concern is perceived costs, or the subjective value to which businesses 
react and respond to the closure scenarios presented (Tobin and Montz, 1997). 
Realistic estimates of economic disruption are at best difficult to obtain and are the 
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weakest link in any study of natural hazards (Monroe and Ballard, 1983). However, 
subjective judgement is a practical and useful way to understand potential costs, 
despite the lack of exact predictive power (Vlachos, 1981). Scenarios have the 
potential to generate new information that can be used as a device to educate and 
communicate to decision-makers (Ericksen, 1975). The Disaster Research Centre at 
the University of Delaware has, for example, conducted a number of studies 
focusing on the vulnerability of businesses to natural hazards (Disaster Research 
Centre, 1998). Studies have provided insights into potential economic losses, hazard 
mitigation priorities, disaster preparedness and recovery planning (ibid). Similarly, a 
number of studies (eg. see the University of Colorado Natural Hazards Database, 
1998) have estimated potential costs arising from natural hazards (eg. following a 
major earthquake in San Francisco) using scenario methods. 
5.3.2 Survey framework 
A copy of the survey used to guide each interview is included as Appendix 4. The 
survey structure is based on a framework put forward by Green et al. (1983:3) to 
estimate non-user costs. 
Non-user costs = f (dependence, susceptibility, transferability), where: 
• Dependence is the degree to which a business requires a particular good as an 
input, or to output that good, in order to function normally. 
• Susceptibility (estimated through the use of the closure scenarios) is the extent to 
which the physical presence of the disruption (on a temporal and spatial basis) 
will affect inputs or output. 
• Transferability is the ability to respond to disruption. 
Disruption awareness was also included in the framework because of the lack of 
recent long-term closure events in the District. 
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'Open-ended questions were used extensively to give a greater freedom for 
respondents to answer in their own terms, rather than within the tramlines of set 
alternatives in closed questions' (Jones, 1985:49). 
Pilot interviews were conducted with three businesses in Kaikoura to ensure that the 
scenarios presented to respondents were easily interpreted. Following the pilot 
interviews, it was decided to tape interviews when respondents did not object. In 
addition, the 1975 Cyclone Alison scenario was omitted because of time constraints 
in the interview process. 
5.3.3 Sample design and survey implementation 
'Sample design in qualitative research is usually purposive; that is, rather than taking 
a random cross section of the population to be studied, small numbers of people with 
specific characteristics are selected to facilitate broad comparisons between groups 
that the researcher thinks·likely to be important' (Morton-Williams, 1985:30). Costs 
were assessed on an industry basis because different industries depend on the road 
network to varying degrees (Chang et al., 1995). 
An input-output table was recently constructed (see Butcher et al., 1998) which 
simultaneously describes the supply and demand relationships of the Kaikoura 
District economy (Miernyk, 1965). The table was used to help determine which 
industries should be included in the interview sample. Industries (eg. mining) 
producing little output (generally less than $1 million) were omitted from the target 
sample. In addition, it was assumed that a number of larger industries (eg. business 
and professional services) would be little affected by closure events. The industries 
surveyed were construction, other foodlbakery, wholesale and retail, restaurant and 
accommodation, freight transport, recreation and culture and two primary producing 
industries. 
The industries surveyed only account for 40 per cent of total industry output in the 
Kaikoura District. However, as stated by Morton-Williams (1985:29), 'because of 
time and cost constraints, a qualitative study can never cover the whole popUlation in 
such a way that all different sub-groups that may be important can be looked at in 
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detail.' Costs incurred by excluded industries have not been included in estimates of 
disruption costs. Accordingly, non-user costs of road network disruption in the 
Kaikoura District are likely to be conservative. 
As stated by Babbie (1998:195), it is appropriate to select a sample 'on the basis of 
your own knowledge of the population; its elements and the nature of your research 
aims. ' Business owners and managers in Kaikoura were non-randomly approached 
in person and informed about the interview purpose. Businesses in operation during 
the 1992 Punchbowl Corner closure were first approached in an attempt to obtain 
more reliable turnover loss estimates for Scenario 1 than loss estimates made by 
respondents not operating in 1992. When respondents indicated that they were 
willing to be interviewed, a meeting time was arranged. The level of cooperation 
was high. Five businesses visited were not willing to participate. Twenty interviews 
were conducted in total. Fifteen of the twenty interviews were recorded (and later 
transcribed) and interviews lasted for approxiniately 30 minutes on average. 
5.3.4 Survey analysis 
The process of survey analysis was largely a search for patterns of similarities and 
differences in responses followed by an interpretation of those patterns (Babbie, 
1998). An important component of the analysis was the calculation of potential 
turnover losses for each closure scenario, based on information provided by survey 
respondents. Survey respondents estimated the percentage of daily turnover that 
may be lost during each closure scenario. The percentage turnover loss estimates, in 
conjunction with gross annual turnover information provided by respondents, 
allowed turnover losses for each closure scenario to be calculated. However, twelve 
respondents did not disclose their gross annual turnover upon which turnover losses 
for each closure scenario could be calculated. The commercial sensitivity of 
financial information, particularly in a small community where businesses may be 
identifiable, often makes data collection difficult (Kerr, 1995). Estimates of annual 
turnover for these businesses were based on national employment to output ratios 
(Statistics NZ, 1998) or ratios of employment to output based on information 
provided by other respondents in the same industry. Loss estimates for twelve 
respondents are, therefore, subject to this additional source of error. 
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Turnover losses predicted by respondents for each closure scenario were adjusted to 
derive direct industry losses in the Kaikoura District, based on output infonnation 
contained in the input-output table. However, the output infonnation contained in 
the input-output table is based on 1990/91 data and does not accurately reflect the 
current level of economic activity in the District. The adjusted industry losses are 
likely to be conservative primarily as a result of the recent growth of tourism in the 
Kaikoura District that is not captured in the 1990/91 table. The growth in tourism is 
seen, for example, in the increase in employment in the wholesale and retail industry 
(up 28 per cent since 1991) and the recreation and culture industry (up 100 per cent 
since 1991) (Butcher et aI., 1998). 
The direct industry turnover losses for each closure scenano do not, however, 
account for total disruption costs. The total impact 'can only be deterinined after 
consideration of flow on (indirett and induced) effects' (Kerr, 1995:159). Indirect 
impacts arise from decreased spending at other businesses as a result of the initial 
impact (Butcher et aI., 1998). If, for example, a tourist does not purchase food at a 
cafe (the direct impact), the cafe may purchase fewer products from the bakery, so 
the bakery output also drops. In addition, the bakery uses less electricity, so the 
electricity provider also loses turnover, and so on. The induced impact is the result of 
decreased household income (eg. wages and profits) being spent at other businesses, 
leading to a further ripple effect of decreased output (ibid). 
Multipliers are used to compare the size of the flow on effects with the size of the 
direct impact and can be calculated by mathematical manipUlation of the input-
output table (see Butcher, 1985b:3-5). Type II output multipliers (the ratio of direct 
plus indirect plus induced impacts to direct impacts) were provided by Butcher (pers. 
com.). The Type II output multipliers allowed the total effects of road network 
disruption on all sectors to be estimated. 
Type II output mUltipliers (for industries expecting direct turnover losses) are shown 
in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Type II output multipliers used to calculate total non-user costs 
Industry 
Other Recreation! Freight Wholesale/ Restaurant! 
foodl culture transport retail accommodation 
bakery 
Direct impact 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Indirect impact 0.28 035 0.30 0.30 0.37 
Induced impact 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.18 
Type II output 1.45 1.55 1.51 1.51 1.55 
multiplier 
Using the restaurant and accommodation industry as an example, every $1 not spent 
has flow on effects of $0.55 and the total change in District output is $1.55. The 
multipliers used in this research are, however, subject to error because the Kaikoura 
District input-output table is not constructed from primary data, but is modified from 
an existing national table using a process called GRIT (generation of regional input-
output tables) (see Butcher, 1985b). The Kaikoura District input-output table 
assumes, for example, that local trade patterns within the Kaikoura District are 
similar to trade patterns at the national level (Kerr, 1995). However, this is unlikely 
to be true because more trade is likely to occur across boundaries in the Kaikoura 
District because of the limited business support infrastructure (Butcher et aI., 1998). 
The multipliers derived from the Kaikoura District input-output table are likely, 
therefore, to overestimate the flow on effects. The GRIT process can, however, be 
improved by incorporating into the table local business expenditure information and 
household consumption information, as performed by Butcher et aI. (1998:7) in their 
study of the economic impact of tourism in Kaikoura. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Disruption awareness 
Nine survey respondents (predominantly from the restaurant and accommodation 
industry) have been in business for only three years (on average) and have not been 
affected by long-term closure events. However, all survey respondents were aware, 
prior to being interviewed, that State Highway 1 and the Inland Road are vulnerable 
to closure. Most new business owners recalled the effects of short-term closures (of 
less than a day) caused by road accidents or temporary closures caused by natural 
hazards. The impacts have, however, been insignificant and largely unnoticed 
because of the short duration of the closures. 
The majority of respondents (11) were in business during the 1992 Punchbowl 
closure and four of these respondents were also in operation during the 1975 
Cyclone Alison event. These respondents were able to draw on past long-term 
closure events in their determination of potential impacts. 
Despite the limited number of recent closure events (and the high proportion of new 
business owners), all respondents believed that future closure events are likely, as 
described below. 
'We are due for a hit. The road will be closed again because of the natural volatility 
of the area. ' 
'Without a doubt. It is just the way we are situated. There are always going to be 
problems. ' 
'Our last one where they had to blow a lot of rock off on that comer [the Punchbowl 
Comer J, there will be trouble with slips and things like that definitely around that 
area again I'd say. It is not that stable. There are always rocks falling on our 
roads. ' 
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The majority of respondents believed that rain-induced hazards (eg. slips, rockfalls 
and flooding) would be the most likely cause of future closures. 
'I would imagine that weather would be our biggest {threat}. You see, even though 
we only have a small amount of rain per year, we can get a lot in a one day or two 
day period. Then we can go without rain for weeks or a month. ' 
'Rain. lfit rains long enough and hard enough. We've had it here in the past and 
we will get it here again. ' 
Several respondents, often with reference to more direct business impacts, 
mentioned earthquakes as a potentially disruptive hazard. 
'The other thing is us sitting on a bloody earthquake fault. They keep telling us it is 
not if but when. So if we had a' really good earthquake which flattens the road we 
are going to have that much infrastructure damage here that we are going to be in 
trouble anyway. ' 
Several respondents were also aware that coastal erosion threatened State Highway 
1. 
'When the sea is rough it undermines the road. There is quite a few places where it 
is happening. ' 
The vulnerability of the road network to natural hazards is well recognised. 
However, three respondents believed that a one-day closure would be the longest 
disruption in a worst case event. A further two respondents did not know how long a 
highway could be closed in a worst case event. Four of these five respondents were 
new business owners. These respondents were also less likely than longer 
established business operators to expect all highway links providing access to 
Kaikoura to be closed simultaneously. 
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Another respondent answered the questions about possible closure lengths with 
reference to link reinstatement policies, which again reflected a lack of closure 
awareness among a limited number of respondents. 
'Well, isn't there a law or something that a highway can't be closed for any more 
than twenty-four hours or something? There is a law that a state highway can't be 
closed for more than a certain time which means that while work is being carried 
out they will always have one lane[openJ at some stage.' 
Given the geographical constraints in the Kaikoura District, the objective of 
restoring single-lane access on highways within twelve hours of the substantial end 
to the emergency event may not always be achievable (Transit NZ, 1998d). 
The majority of respondents (15) (including several new business owners) believed 
. -
closures of several days or more are likely. 
'Weeks wouldn't it be? There is no where to go. The steep faces are only on the 
other side of the road. ' 
'A week to a fortnight, especially around the tunnels [south of Kaikoura on State 
Highway 1 J and the other way around the Blue Mud [Blue Slip J. ' 
'The length of closure would be hard to say. Like the snow one, it could be three or 
four days, but you get Cyclone Alison or a big sea and it could be weeks. ' 
The majority of respondents also believed that all highways providing access to 
Kaikoura could be closed simultaneously. One respondent, for example, referred to 
the Cyclone Alison closure event, as described below. 
'Cyclone Alison was one of the worst ones we have had. 
[Do you think that type of event could happen again? J 
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Easy. Of course it could. These cyclones come down the coast and then straight in 
here. They come out of the Pacific and go across the top of the North Island and 
circle around in here and get us. And that is what Cyclone Alison was. It was a 
cyclone that came down from up north and gave us rain. ' 
Most respondents felt that Kaikoura would only be isolated for short periods (one to 
three days). However, several respondents believed that a major earthquake or flood 
might isolate Kaikoura for a week or more. 
'I suppose anything is possible in an earthquake or something like that. I would 
think you would at least have to look at a week. ' 
'I am not really sure about the Inland Road but it could {also be closed} by an 
earthquake or flooding. An earthquake could be the most serious which is feasible 
with the plates we have around here. lfit was a bad earthquake, it {isolation} could 
be for weeks. ' 
Six respondents believed that the simultaneous closure of all links providing access 
to Kaikoura was unlikely because the Inland Road is more secure than State 
Highway 1. However, five of these six respondents did not discuss earthquakes as a 
potentially disruptive hazard. 
'The Inland Road is always open if State Highway 1 is closed. ' 
'I don't know about the Inland Road. It is probably a wee bit safer not being coastal 
but certainly north and south could be closed {simultaneously} yes. Anything up to 
three or four days. ' 
'Get a decent southerly storm in here and you could be {isolated}, but not so much 
the Inland Road. I think you'd always get out through there, unless there was snow 
involved. ' 
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The recent historical record indicates that the Inland Road has been quite secure. 
However, all links have been closed simultaneously in the past and future 
simultaneous disruption is possible. 
Despite the generally well recognised closure threat in the Kaikoura District, no 
respondents currently compensate for the possibility of road closure. Monetary 
constraints (eg. the expense of carrying higher levels of inventory) or the inability to 
provide adequate compensatory measures (eg. for businesses which derive 100 per 
cent of turnover from tourist purchases) prevents the adoption of cost prevention 
practices. Accordingly, most respondents are greatly dependent on the road network. 
5.4.2 Transport Dependence 
Road transport is the most important mode of transport among respondents. No 
respondents rely directly on rail transport or air transport to source inputs. A limited 
number of tourists travelling by rail do, however, contribute to the turnover of 
tourism oriented businesses (10 per cent or less of total turnover). Accordingly, rail 
transport is not seen as an essential mode of transport among respondents. 
State Highway 1 is the most important highway for respondents and is used (or 
relied on) frequently (several times weekly to daily). The Inland Road is less 
important than State Highway 1 for the majority of respondents, although increasing 
numbers of tourists travelling between Kaikoura and Hanmer Springs contribute to 
the turnover of tourism oriented businesses. Several respondents expected the 
number of tourists using the Inland Road to increase when the highway sealing 
programme is complete, as described below. 
'You will get a lot more coming through the Inland Road when it is sealed because 
they [tourists] are not allowed to come through the Inland Road in rental cars 
because it is unsealed. ' 
Oniy a limited number of respondents (eg. from the other food/bakery, freight 
transport and construction industries) are strongly supported by local community 
67 
purchases. The majority of respondents depend more greatly on direct tourist 
purchases than local community purchases. 
All respondents (except primary producing businesses) do much (or all) of their 
buying out of the Kaikoura District. However, most small goods (eg. basic cleaning 
supplies) and services are sourced locally. The limited size of the Kaikoura economy 
(eg. the small manufacturing base) necessitates road links with larger centres of 
commerce. 
5.4.3 Scenario 1: 1992 Punchbowl Corner closure 
The majority of respondents (17) believed that the Punchbowl closure would 
condition direct turnover losses. However, three respondents believed that the 
closure would not condition direct turnover losses. 
No loss in turnover 
Primary producing businesses were little affected by the Punchbowl closure because 
almost all inputs are sourced locally and the export of produce can be delayed or 
redirected, as described below. 
<If we have to, we just hold the product. When the Punchbowl was closed we just 
worked around it. Sometimes we went through the Inland Road and sometimes we 
just waited until they opened it [temporary openings were in place to allow further 
remedial works to be carried out] and put it [the product] through.' 
This respondent recalled that any loss in turnover was minimal and expected impacts 
to be similar now. 
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A respondent from the construction industry could not accurately recall the effects of 
the Punchbowl closure, but believed that the event could be inconvenient in the 
future because only 10 per cent of supplies are sourced locally. 
'Some of the things, like for me, I have got a kitchen arriving on Tuesday but I don't 
need it until next week, that is the scenario I operate under. I like to have things 
sitting here in Kaikoura two or three days, or maybe a week ahead. But if you are 
cutting things fine and this sort of thing happens sure, that could affect me and you 
could get caught out. 
You realise that a larger builder can't have a lot of stock lying around, they are 
virtually hand to mouth because they can't afford to have a lot of money outlaid so 
. they would be affected a lot more. 
We get excellent service now. I can ring up afreight company up until about 2.00pm 
today and I can have materials here tomorrow when you need it, but normally we 
are well ahead. A lot of builders rely on that scenario, but if this happened ... ' 
This respondent did not believe the business would lose turnover. However, the 
respondent discussed the additional costs likely to be incurred by accessing supplies 
from alternative markets, if required. 
Turnover losses 
Eight respondents (three of whom were in operation in 1992) believed that business 
wellbeing would be seriously affected by the Punchbowl closure, after 
approximately four days (on average). However, seven respondents expected 
disruptive, but not serious impacts. 
Three retailers were seriously affected by the 1992 event and expected similar 
turnover reductions now. Turnover losses of between 25 per cent and 50 per cent 
were incurred because customer numbers dropped markedly. However, one retailer 
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estimated that turnover dropped by 80 per cent, which seriously affected business 
wellbeing immediately, as described below. 
'People just didn't come to Kaikoura. People that came through the Inland Road 
were not shoppers. They just wanted to get through [to their destination}. People 
just shot up north because they were brassed off with delays. They didn't shop and 
wander ... You can't replace those tourists. They don't come again. It is lost trade 
and profit. ' 
Similarly, four respondents in the accommodation sector unaffected by past closures 
also believed business wellbeing would be seriously affected (losses of 45 per cent 
on average were predicted) because of the reluctance of road-users to detour to the 
Inland Road. 
'We get most of the people jusf.driving through and a lot of them wouldn't bother 
coming through the Inland Road. ' 
'It [the closure} would 'have a considerable impact because tourists from the south 
would be turned off coming. ' 
In contrast, the majority of'respondents from the restaurant sector and recreation and 
culture industry, for example, expected to incur more moderate turnover losses 
(between 5 per cent and 25 per cent) because it was believed that tourists would 
detour to the Inland Road. 
'People would come via the Inland Road [during the Punchbowl closure} so there 
would not be much disruption. People will get through. People on holidays will find 
their way. ' 
'That [the Punchbowl closure} would be disruptive to a moderate degree. Some 
tourists would just go the longer way because they come from the other side of the 
world. Often, the whales and dolphins are what motivates them to choose Kaikoura 
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as a destination. These people would still travel the extra distance. That's why I am 
thinking the impacts would be moderate. ' 
There is clearly a mixed perception among respondents about the value of the Inland 
Road as an alternative route, which is also related to the varied opinions about 
Kaikoura's appeal as a destination in its own right. 
All respondents who incurred losses during the 1992 Punchbowl closure expected 
losses to be greater in the future, primarily because of the recent growth in tourism. 
A respondent from the freight transport industry, for example, obtains 70 per cent of 
freight from Christchurch and incurred significant costs during the Punchbowl 
closure event. However, the respondent believed that the impacts of disruption 
would be far greater now because the company is moving more freight for tourism 
oriented businesses. Similarly, a respondent from the other foodlbakery industry 
noted that the impacts of disruption would be greater now, as described below. 
'The Punchbowl was and wasn't disruptive. Like it was for the fact that the day 
wasn't as busy, but then again we were supplying the men that worked on it [the 
remedial works}. It would be worse now though because the turnover has just been 
getting better and better every year. ' 
A motelier in operation during the 1992 Punchbowl event also discussed the costs 
and benefits of the 1992 closure, but noted that impacts may be more severe in the 
future, as described below. 
'When the Punchbowl was closed it was in the winter time and it was quite good for 
us because people weren't keen on driving through the Inland Road at night with the 
ice and conditions. It probably did affect us as far as people coming up from 
Christchurch, they might have gone up through the West Coast or whatever, but we 
found at night time people would get here and wouldn't go through the Inland Road 
at night. 
[So your business didn't lose turnover?} 
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It all sort of balanced out. It was our quiet time of year anyway and it might have 
even helped us a bit ... If it [the closure J occurred during the busy periods though we 
would lose because people wouldn't come. People are very funny you see, as soon 
as they hear of something going wrong they don't want to know about it. ' 
5.4.4 Scenario 2: Closure of both links south of Kaikoura 
The majority of respondents (16) believed that Scenario 2 would be more disruptive 
to business operations than the Punchbowl closure. However, four respondents 
believed that the impacts of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 would not be different. 
Average turnover losses predicted for Scenario 2 are approximately 150 per cent 
higher than losses predicted in Scenario 1. 
Similar disruption to Scenario 1 
Primary producing respondents would not lose turnover in Scenario 2 because 
produce could be stored on site or alternative export arrangements could be made, as 
described below. 
'That [Scenario 2J would pretty much have the same impact [as Scenario 1]. Ifwe 
had to and the northern route was open we'd organise to whip the product through 
to Blenheim and fly them down [to ChristchurchJ or whip them out of Wellington or 
Auckland. There are just heaps of different alternatives. I just don't think the road 
could ever be closed long enough to give us a noticeable loss. 
[So you have enough packaging and materials to see you through? J 
We have a good supply of packaging here to last for two to three weeks. lfwe can't 
get supplies in, we obviously can't get product out so what is the point of the 
packaging anyway? It is a double edged sword isn't it?' 
Two other respondents expected the impacts of Scenario 2 to be similar to the 
Punchbowl event because both respondents believed that tourists would not detour to 
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the Inland Road during the Punchbowl closure event. For both scenarios, turnover 
losses of 70 per cent and 80 per cent were predicted. 
Greater disruption than Scenario 1 
The accommodation sector predicted the greatest turnover losses for Scenario 2 
(between 70 per cent and 100 per cent). Three accommodation sector respondents 
estimated turnover losses of 100 per cent for Scenario 2. 
'This [Scenario 2J would be much worse obviously [than Scenario IJ because they 
[touristsJ have no alternative whatsoever and if the traffic from the ferry couldn't 
get through the Inland Road they wouldn't come this way. We wouldn't get any 
business unless we already had people in town that had to stay, which 1 doubt... I 
would think that 100 per cent of our business would be gone. I think it would be 
pretty devastating. ' 
Respondents from the recreation and culture industry also predicted considerable 
turnover losses (between 50 per cent and 90 per cent), as described below. 
'That [Scenario 2J would impact markedly on our operations. In the tourist industry 
you are faced with whatever happens. You can't do anything about it. It is like 
when Kaikoura flooded and trips were cancelled and you don't get any help from 
anywhere. You just have to sit and bear it through ... As soon as the road was closed 
the trips the following day, well maybe not the following day because the tourists are 
always in Kaikoura the night before, but definitely the day after that you'd be down 
to ... well all the bookings that were made ... you'd be down I'd say within two days 
and you'd be cancelling trips ... We wouldn't know what was going to come from the 
north. They might fly people into Kaikoura but I doubt it. In the end, I think you'd 
just about have to close up shop. ' 
Of concern for most respondents dependent on tourist purchases would be the loss of 
visitors originating in Christchurch, including many on return trips. The loss of the 
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Christchurch market, in conjunction with the reluctance of southbound tourists to 
travel to Kaikoura, may seriously affect the wellbeing of many businesses. 
The majority of respondents in the retail, restaurant and other foodlbakery sectors 
also expected to be seriously affected by Scenario 2. The predicted turnover losses 
(50 per cent to 80 per cent) are, however, lower than those estimated by 
accommodation sector respondents because these industries are more strongly 
supported by local community purchases than accommodation sector respondents. 
Disruption among retailers, restaurants and other foodlbakery respondents would 
largely be a result of the drop in tourist spending, rather than the inability (or need) 
to source supplies. Supplies are generally held in sufficient quantities to last a week 
or more (particularly for larger businesses). However, some businesses (eg. food 
oriented retailers and restaurants) would need to source fresh produce from 
alternative markets in order to continue normal operations. The need to make 
alternative input arrangements largely depends on timing, as stated by one other 
food/bakery respondent. 
'At the moment, with current levels of stock, if it was closed tonight we'd only last 
tomorrow because the order [from ChristchurchJ arrives tomorrow. We would need 
to get the supplies from somewhere else if it was closed tonight. If it happened 
tomorrow after the stock arrived then we'd get away with probably a week. ' 
However, with these adjustments come new costs to businesses, as stated by a 
respondent in the freight transport industry. 
'It [Scenario 2J would be extremely disruptive ... Marlborough itself hasn't got the 
expertise to supply what Christchurch can supply, goods wise I mean. Plus, the cost 
factor comes into it... There is money lost into the town because businesses have to 
pay more for their goods. ' 
The freight transport respondent believed that it would not be cost-effective to 'back 
track' to Christchurch via the Lewis Pass to pick up freight, unless clients were 
prepared to pay the additional costs. This respondent estimated that up to 70 per 
74 
cent of turnover could be lost because Christchurch is the main centre serviced by 
the company. 
Only eight respondents expected the wellbeing of their business to be seriously 
affected in Scenario 1 (and these businesses were more likely to be smaller 
operators). However, in Scenario 2, fifteen respondents indicated that the wellbeing 
of their business would be seriously affected, again, after approximately four days 
( on average). In addition, many respondents believed that Scenario 2 might be 
detrimental to long-term business wellbeing, as described below. 
'We hope to think the loss in turnover would be manageable. We hope we have 
enough leeway for two weeks. It might mean we make choices in next years budget. ' 
'We'd survive but you would feel it later on~ Although you wouldn't be paying out 
much because your not getting people in there are still some ongoing costs that 
would take a long time to recover. ' 
In response to the potential losses predicted in Scenario 2, many businesses noted 
that changes would need to be made to minimise outgoings, such as reducing staff 
hours, as described below. 
'Unfortunately staff would miss outfor starters. You'djust work yourself. I always 
keep good stock on hand so you just wouldn't buy anything. You'd just tighten 
everything up. ' 
5.4.5 Scenario 3: Closure of State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura 
The majority of respondents (14) believed that the closure of State Highway 1 to the 
north of Kaikoura would be less disruptive than Scenario 2. Six respondents 
believed that the impacts of Scenario 2 and. Scenario 3 would not be different. 
Average turnover losses expected for Scenario 3 are approximately 35 per cent lower 
than losses predicted in Scenario 2 and approximately 65 per cent higher than losses 
predicted in Scenario 1. 
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Similar disruption to Scenario 2 
Respondents from the primary producing and construction industries would be little 
affected by the closure of State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura. However, one 
primary producing respondent believed that the closure could result in minor losses, 
as described below. 
'We would lose income from our fresh produce, but we could negotiate with 
someone from the south possibly. That would be the biggest inconvenience of the lot 
financially. It wouldn't leave us stopping production and is not a big margin 
involved. We could lose $4000 a week ifwe couldn't get anyone to take our product 
to the south. ' 
Other respondents (from the retail and restaurant sectors) believed that the impacts 
of Scenario 3· would be similar to Scenario 2 because ferry traffic would again 
bypass Kaikoura. 
Less disruption than Scenario 2 
The majority of respondents (including all accommodation sector and recreation and 
culture industry respondents) expected less disruptive impacts in Scenario 3 than in 
Scenario 2 because of the benefits the Christchurch market provides. 
'Closure of the northern route probably would not be as disruptive [as Scenario 2 J 
because we have a lot of tourists coming up from Christchurch that go back to 
Christchurch. They stay here for the last two or three days and then go back and fly 
out. ' 
'A lot of people fly into Christchurch and pick up their campervans. A lesser 
percentage come across on the ferry than they do from the South Island. ' 
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'No, it [the closure of State Highway 1 north of KaikouraJ wouldn't seriously affect 
us. All our supplies come from Christchurch and Christchurch people and local 
trade will keep us going. The turnover may drop 10 per cent. ' 
One recreation and culture respondent also discussed the impacts of losing north-
bound ferry traffic. 
'It [Scenario 3 J would have less of an impact [than Scenario 2J other than a lot of 
people travel on to Picton after being here. I think that would have an impact 
because the people are not so much the dedicated activities people but are there on 
vacation and passing through and go whale watching or dolphin swimming because 
it is the thing to do. If these people can't get through to Picton they may decide to 
fly up from Christchurch and so yes that must impact on us. The greater proportion 
of our people travel from the south and go up to Picton, so it may cut 25 per cent to 
50 per cent of people. j 
Fourteen respondents predicted that the wellbeing of their business would be 
seriously 'affected in Scenario 3 (one less than in Scenario 2) and many respondents 
also discussed the long-term costs of link: disruption. 
'Any loss hi turnover would seriously affect us because we are such a small 
business, irrespective of which closure you are talking about. If it is only the north 
closed, it is not as bad as southbound, but any loss in turnover is serious. There is no 
way of retrieving that money. Once it has gone you have lost it and you haven't got 
any options to say, OK, we are going to do some advertising to grab some quick 
cash because we are too small. We are totally reliant on any money we receive here. 
It is not as though we have other incomes coming in so it would be desperate within 
seven days. ' 
5.4.6 Seasonal Influence 
All respondents (excluding one primary producing respondent) indicated that future 
closures would be more severe between November and April, as described below. 
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'These closures would hurt us if they occurred during summer. The southern closure 
would be the worst one if it was closed. We wouldn't want many days of disruption 
over summer because that is when we make our money. You wouldn't want more 
than four or five days. ' 
Most businesses are sustained through the quieter winter months by the summer 
profits. 
'We just tick over in the winter season and although we are just ticking over all our 
buying and all our product is arriving for the summer season so your outgoings are 
high, but there is not a lot of income, so you have to rely on the summer season.' 
. Non-tourism oriented industries such as the construction industry would also expect 
impacts to be greater in the summer months because builders work more hours (and 
hence need more supplies) because the weather is favourable. In addition, one 
primary producing business exports produce to northern markets over the summer 
period and the closure of State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura would condition 
greater inconvenience and costs. 
The general consensus among respondents is that winter closures would still have 
considerable impacts, but losses woula be more manageable, as described by one 
motelier. 
'It would still affect us in winter because we still don't have many days with nobody 
in. Even in winter, you would feel the pinch after a few days, just not on such a 
large scale. It doesn't matter what time of year it is, it would definitely affect 
business. ' 
5.4.7 Transferability 
Post-disruption compensatory measures would be adopted or 'investigated' by the 
majority of respondents (12). However, eight respondents (including five 
accommodation respondents) could not make any adjustments to minimise impacts. 
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Accommodation sector respondents have sufficient supplies available to last beyond 
the closure duration of the three scenarios and would not need to source inputs from 
available markets. Respondents believed that the greatest impacts would arise from 
the loss of tourist traffic, for which no contingency plans could be provided. 
Recreation and culture respondents suggested that bus-pick up arrangements (where 
tourists could walk around a closure site safely) or an air link may be investigated. 
However, like other industries largely dependent on tourist purchases, the recreation 
and culture industry suggested that cost minimisation practices are unlikely to be 
successful, as described below. 
'An air link would be looked into but that straight away adds costs and to get 
something like that organised and to promote it as an option ... your just about back 
to all the roads being open. I don't think it would be cost-effective. ' 
A respondent from the freight transport industry would encourage local businesses to 
source inputs from alternative markets. Invariably, however, freight services would 
be greatly disrupted because additional road-user costs would prevent all regular 
services from operating. 
Respondents in the retail, restaurant and other foodlbakery sectors could source 
inputs from alternative markets, if required. 
'If a closure occurred when our summer stock was arriving [in September and 
October] that would affect us greatly, but if it happened half way through summer 
when all our stock is in it wouldn't affect us because we are just relying on top-ups. 
If our summer stock couldn't get through we'd probably try and get it down [from 
Blenheim] some other way ifwe could. ' 
Similarly, another retailer suggested that they might fly in stock from Wellington if 
State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is closed because the cost is not excessive. 
79 
However, most respondents expect to incur the greatest costs largely as a result of 
the drop in tourist spending, for which no contingency plans can be provided. 
Respondents from industries less dependent on tourism (eg. the construction industry 
and primary producing industries) have the most effective contingency plans and 
consequently are little disrupted by road closure events. However, all contingency 
plans condition additional costs. 
Most respondents will be unable to overcome the effects of road network disruption 
by transference. In addition, only one respondent believed that their business could 
be better prepared for future closures by increasing storage capacity for produce. 
5.4.8 Returning to pre-closure levels of activity and income 
Six respondents in operation during Scenario 1 (from eleven respondents in total) 
stated that their businesses 'returned to normality immediately after link 
reinstatement works were complete. However, these businesses (eg. primary 
producing respondents) were little affected by the Punchbowl closure. Businesses 
with a greater reliance on tourist purchases (eg. retailers) stated that it took several 
days (on average) for business to return to normality. One respondent also discussed 
the role of the media in influencing road-users travel plans, as described below. 
'What you also have is the effect of bad press. People [locals] thought that when the 
road closures were happening at the Punchbowl it was bad press that affected it 
[business] more than anything else ... When something is reported in the newspaper it 
is usually made very dramatic. You know 'road closures' and people think 
'goodness me.' It happened up in the North Island when they had the floods ... and 
people just stopped travelling because they see it on the news and they think oh, 
we're not going there. They don't realise that in a few days time everybody has 
cleared up and operating again, so that does take quite a while to filter through ... It 
is a bit like when we had the flood in 1993 in Kaikoura. That impacted for quite a 
while. ' 
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Of the nine businesses unaffected by the Punchbowl closure, five respondents 
believed that their business would return to its pre-closure level of activity and 
income immediately after link reinstatement. Other respondents believed it would 
take between one and three days to return to normality following link reinstatement. 
These mixed perceptions showed little variation between the three scenarios. 
However, based on a limited number of responses, it is reasonable to assume that 
some businesses (eg. the accommodation sector) may incur residual losses for short 
periods following link reinstatement. 
5.4.9 Turnover loss estimates for closure scenarios 
Turnover losses predicted by respondents for the three closure scenarios were 
adjusted to account for direct industry losses in the Kaikoura District (refer to 
section 5.3.4).· The direct industry losses were multiplied by Type II output 
multipliers to obtain total non-user costs (refer to section 5.3.4 for the definition of 
total costs and the multipliers used to derive total costs). Direct non-user costs and 
total non-user costs arising from the three closure scenarios are shown in Table 5.3 
(industry costs are aggregated to preserve confidentiality). 
Table 5.3: Direct non-user costs and total non-user costs of road network disruption 
in the Kaikoura District 
Directcost Total cost Total cost per day 
of route closure 
Scenario 1 $240,288 $367,385 $28,260 
Scenario 2 $809,556 $1,241,993 $95,538 
Scenario 3 $568,016 $872,568 $67,121 
The greatest costs are incurred by the restaurant and accommodation industry, 
wholesale and retail industry, recreation and culture industry and freight transport 
industry respectively. The other food/bakery industry incurs the lowest proportion 
of total costs because respondents are more strongly supported by local community 
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purchases than other industries. Primary producing industries and the construction 
industry incur no direct turnover losses. 
Table 5.3 shows that daily non-user costs are significant for a small rural economy. 
The loss of inter-regional traffic adversely effects the financial wellbeing of many 
businesses in the Kaikoura District, particularly when road links with Christchurch 
are dislocated. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Business operators in the Kaikoura District are strongly dependent on road links with 
larger centres of commerce and are, therefore, acutely aware of the vulnerability of 
the road network to closure. However, a limited number of business owners 
(particularly new business owners) were unaware of the potential for long-term 
closure events. The majority of survey respondents would incur significant turnover 
losses during road closure events (particularly between November and April) and 
would be unable to provide adequate contingency plans to overcome the effects of 
road closure events. Accordingly, road closure events would seriously affect the 
financial wellbeing of many businesses after approximately four days. 
The closure of both southern links would condition the greatest non-user costs 
(approximately $95,000 per day), which emphasises the importance of the 
Christchurch market to the vitality of the Kaikoura District economy. When State 
Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is closed, non-user costs are also significant 
(approximately $67,000 per day) because respondents expect road-users travelling 
between Christchurch and the north of the South Island to bypass Kaikoura. 
However, the cost of Scenario 1 is less than the cost of Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 
because a low-cost alternative route (Highway 70) is available for road-users. 
Non-user costs are combined with road-user costs in the concluding chapter, and 
implications for policy are discussed. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The following chapter summarises the main findings of this research and describes 
the limitations of the research methodology. Policy implications and 
recommendations conclude this research. 
6.2 Summary of research 
The New Zealand road network is vulnerable to closure from a host of natural 
hazards. Road closure events can occur frequently, depending on natural variations 
in hazard occurrence. It is not uncommon for road links to be severed for periods of 
several days or more. The cost of reinstating state highway links in New Zealand 
has exceeded $12 million annually since 1995. 
This research has provided insights into road network vulnerability in the Kaikoura 
District and the consequential costs of disruption for road-users and non-users. The 
road network in the Kaikoura District is vulnerable to closure from a range of natural 
hazards, including potentially catastrophic and poorly understood natural hazards 
such as powerful tsunamis and earthquakes. The historical review of closures 
indicates that rain-induced natural hazards (eg. flooding and landslides) have been 
the most frequent cause of road network disruption in the District, particularly along 
State Highway 1. However, all links providing access to Kaikoura can be closed 
simultaneously, thereby isolating Kaikoura from larger centres of commerce. 
There is only one alternative route (Highway 70) available to road-users in the 
Kaikoura District when State Highway 1 is closed south of Kaikoura. No alternative 
route is available in the Kaikoura District for State Highway 1 to the north of 
Kaikoura. Table 6.1 shows how daily disruption costs vary by closure scenario and 
shows that costs are significantly lower when a low-cost alternative route (Highway 
70) is available (see Scenario 1). 
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Table 6.1: The daily cost of road closure events in the Kaikoura District 
Type of ClosureofSHl Clbsllfe of.hoth links Closure of SHlnorth 
cost south ofKaikouta ... . south of Kaikouta of Kaikoura 
(Scenario 1) (Scenario 2) (Scenario 3) 
Road-user $40,589 (59%) $239,352 (71%) $217,395 (76%) 
Non-user $28,260 (41%) $95,538 (29%) $67,121 (24%) 
Total $68,849 (100%) $334,890 (100%) $284,516 (100%) 
Daily disruption costs are significant when vehicles detour to the Lewis Pass route 
(Scenario 2 and Scenario 3). The cost of Scenario 2 is greater than the cost of 
Scenario 3 because of the importance of the Christchurch market to the vitality of the 
Kaikoura District economy and as a result of disruption to the high traffic volumes 
on the Waipara to Kaikoura link. 
Table 6.1 also highlights the severity and diversity of impacts associated with road 
closure events. Road-user costs represent the greatest road network disruption costs 
in the Kaikoura District. However, non-user costs are also considerable, particularly 
for a small rural economy. Although non-user costs are lower than road-user costs, 
.non-user costs are greater than road-user costs on a cost per person-affected basis. 
In communities larger than Kaikoura, non-user costs are likely to be more prominent 
(eg. in New Plymouth when State Highway 3 is closed). 
Total daily disruption costs are substantial. For example, closures of four days or 
more would condition disruption costs in excess of $1 million when road-users are 
required to detour to the Lewis Pass route. Other disruption costs that have not been 
included in the analysis (eg. costs to industries not surveyed and delay costs to road-
users) would further inflate total disruption costs. 
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6.3 Limitations of research and opportunities for further research 
The major limitation of the research methodology is that road-user costs and non-
user costs of road network disruption are not derived from information pertaining to 
a recent road closure event, but are predominantly based on assumptions about 
'potential' road closure events. The road-user cost and non-user cost estimates made 
in this research are, therefore, subject to error. 
Numerous assumptions were employed in assigning road-user costs. For example, 
pre-disruption and post-disruption vehicle movements were not known with any 
certainty, which only allowed a general range of 'possible' costs to be calculated. 
Further research (eg. origin/destination surveys of State Highway 1 road-users) 
. would provide a more accurate picture of vehicle movement patterns and a more 
accurate estimate of road-user costs. 
Inaccuracies in assigning non-user costs also arose because survey respondents were 
not able to base turnover loss estimates on recent closure events. The diversity of 
impacts predicted by iocal businesses for the three closure scenarios suggests that 
'potential' costs may not be a very reliable basis for policy development. A more 
comprehensive post-disruption assessment of non-user costs would provide a richer 
and more reliable source of information applicable to policy development. For 
example, an assessment of post-disruption non-user costs (particularly in larger 
centres such as New Plymouth) may provide a better understanding of the 
significance of non-user costs on a temporal basis and would be useful in evaluating 
impacts across a more diverse range of industries (eg. the manufacturing industry). 
Further limitations of the research methodology arise from the potential for biases 
and distortion in the data collection and analysis process. For example, the non-user 
cost sample selection was biased towards industries more likely to be adversely 
effected by road closure. If similar research is conducted in the future, it would be 
beneficial to randomly sample a higher number of businesses (from a more diverse 
range of industries) to gain insights into the range of costs (and possible benefits) 
arising from recent road closure events. In addition, the analysis of interview data 
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imposed an artificial structure on the data obtained from survey respondents. 
Relevant information or interpretations of data may have been excluded from the 
analysis or may have been presented differently under different conditions or 
assumptions. 
6.4 Policy implications 
The estimated costs of road closure events in the Kaikoura District suggest that the 
reinstatement of a link south of Kaikoura should take precedence if all links are 
closed simultaneously. It would be preferable to reinstate State Highway 1 before 
Highway 70 unless Highway 70 could be reinstated significantly more quickly. 
When one southern link is operational, State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura 
should then be reinstated. 
Road closure events condition costs for most businesses in the Kaikoura District 
immediately after link closure, and the costs of disruption become progressively 
worse each day of link closure. The compounding costs reinforce the need for 
prompt reinstatement or, at a minimum, the provision of limited access availability 
(eg. single-lane openings). An optimal disposition of maintenance resources (eg. 
bailey bridges) would help ensure that restoration delays are kept to a minimum. 
Repair strategies will become of utmost importance on busier state highway links 
connecting larger centres of commerce (eg. New Plymouth and Auckland via State 
Highway 3), particularly where no low-cost alternative route is available. 
After approximately four days, the financial wellbeing of many businesses in the 
Kaikoura District may be seriously affected by road closure events. Ideally, link 
reinstatement should be complete within this time frame, pending funding and 
technology cobstraints. If closures extend beyond a four-day period, particularly 
between November and April, losses may cause considerable financial strain and 
result in long-term impacts for many local businesses. 
The availability of low-cost alternative links (eg. Highway 70) minimises the risk 
associated with the closure of strategically vital links (eg. State Highway 1). The 
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availability of the Rainbow route as an emergency alternative would minimise the 
risk associated with the closure of State Highway 1 and provides existing traffic 
flows (eg. Christchurch to Nelson traffic) with an alternative route to State Highway 
65. However, the capital costs of upgrading the Rainbow link to cater for all vehicle 
classes is likely to be significant and may not be economically justified givyn the 
low traffic volumes using State Highway 1 (and State Highway 65) and the tecent 
security of State Highway 1. Accordingly, this research highlights the strategic 
importance of the State Highway 1 link to the north of Kaikoura because no low-cost 
alternative route is available when this link is closed. If further preventative 
maintenance works are to be allocated in the Kaikoura District (eg. improved coastal 
protection works) available funding should be directed to State Highway 1 to the 
north of Kaikoura. The security of this link is not only critical to non-users in the 
. Kaikoura District, but also to inter-regional traffic (eg. freight flows) travelling 
between Christchurch and the north of the South Island. 
The strategic importance (and vulnerability) of links on a 'network' wide basis needs 
to be more clearly recognised in New Zealand if long-term road network disruption 
costs are to be minimised. More comprehensive and co-ordinated informati'on about 
the risk of road network disruption in New Zealand would help reduce costs for 
road-users and non-users by providing effective contingency planning information 
for the road transport industry and enhanced network repair priorities and strategies 
for road controlling authorities. A New Zealand wide risk analysis study focusing 
on the vulnerability of state highway links to closure and the consequential costs of 
disruption for road-users and non-users would also help determine priorities for the 
allocation of roading expenditure in New Zealand. For example, road controlling 
authorities could focus on the most vulnerable parts of the road network and 
determine where highway improvement works (including preventative maintenance 
works and improvement works to alternative links) would be most beneficial. It is 
also important that the strategic benefits (and vulnerability) of links from a 'network' 
perspective are incorporated into the benefit-cost assessment process for highway 
improvement projects. Continued development and application of newly established 
methodologies (eg. National Strategic Factors - Security of Access) should be 
encouraged to ensure that the strategic benefits of links are captured adequately. 
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6.S Recommendations 
• Further research into the vulnerability of the road network in the Kaikoura 
District to closure from the tsunami hazard and the earthquake hazard 
(including earthquake-induced landslides) because these hazards have the 
potential to sever the road network for extended durations. Of particular 
concern is the area of State Highway 1 between Oaro and the Kahutara River 
and the Hapuku River and the Clarence River where State Highway 1 is 
immediately adjacent to the coast and has historically, been affected by 
highway instability problems. The Institute of Geological and Nuclear 
Sciences and the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric research could 
provide the necessary research expertise to gauge the severity (and 
probability) of the closure threat. 
• Consideration· of further preventative maintenance works (eg. coastal 
protection works) along State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura. This 
research has shown that State Highway 1 to the north Of Kaikoura is the most 
important single link in the Kaikoura District because no low-cost alternative 
route is available when this link is closed. Future studies, which investigate 
the benefits and costs of providing improved protection works along this link, 
is recommended because of the strategic importance of this link from a 
'network' perspective. 
• Further research into the benefits and costs of opening the Rainbow route to 
all vehicle classes (perhaps as a toll road), including the benefits the route 
would provide for existing traffic flows. If State Highway 1 is dislocated for 
an extended duration, the availability of the Rainbow route would minimise 
long-term disruption costs. Road controlling authorities, local landowners 
and the Department of Conservation would need to coordinate if route 
upgrading was determined to be in the national interest. 
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• More comprehensive and easily accessible information about road closure 
events in New Zealand, particularly with regard to the frequency and 
duration of closure events and the degree of disruption incurred by road-users 
and non-users. A more cohesive and in-depth information base would 
improve road network management and provide valuable information for 
future research projects. It would be beneficial if road controlling authorities 
could synthesise and report information about road closure events on a 
regular (eg. monthly reporting) basis. 
• The ongoing road closure threat in New Zealand and the sparseness of the 
national road network warrants consideration of a New Zealand wide risk 
analysis study, which determines priorities for link reinstatement and the 
allocation of roading expenditure. The study should also determine if 
maintenance resources are located optimally. In addition, the study should 
documen.t those communities most vulnerable to disruption and the likely 
impacts of network disruption based on past events. It would be beneficial to 
clearly address (in a systematic and consistent framework) the management 
of road closures caused by natural hazards. 
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Appendix 1: Historical review of past disruptions in the Kaikoura 
District 
June 1950 - SHI closed, including washouts near Clarence River bridge. 
January 1951 - Eleven blockages north of Kaikoura. Slips and washouts between 
Rakautara and the Clarence River bridge. Cheviot earthquake caused no damage to 
roads. 
August 1952 - Slips at Blue Duck and between Hundalee and Oaro. Washout at 
Mangamaunu. Flooding at Cheviot. Washout at Oaro River bridge. 
December 1952 - Flooding of Kowhai River. Twenty-five feet of the approach to 
the Kowhai River bridge lost and 5 feet of the approach to Stoney Creek was washed 
away. At least a 24 hour closure south of Kaikoura. 
January 1953 - Slips at Blue Slip and White Slip north of the Claret;lce River. 
Clarence River bridge damaged. Shingle Fans closed. Kowhai River bridge 
approaches were washed out. Cribb Creek bridge underwater on Highway 70. 
June 1953 - Slips north of Kaikoura. Major slip between Blue Duck Stream and 
Rakautara. 
August 1954 - SHI north and south of Kaikoura damaged. Road blocked at Cheviot 
by floodwater and in Hundalees by slips. Two major slips came down at Okarahia 
and one at Oaro. SHI covered by floodwater at Golf Links. 
December 1954 - Minor damage to SHI as the Kowhai River overflowed. 
October 1956 - SHI closed at Shingle Fans. 
1959 - Slip between Okarahia and the Black Birch forest south of Kaikoura. SHI 
closed for at least 48 hours. 
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January 1961 - Shingle Fans blocked. Traffic forced to travel via Lewis Pass. At 
the Ure River, 50 miles north of Kaikoura, 3 feet of water covered the road. Slip 14 
miles north of Kaikoura. SHI closed Monday, January 16 to Wednesday, January 
18. 
May 1961 - Heavy rain (up to 10 inches in 24 hours). SHI flood damage from 
Awatere to Hundalee and flood damage on H70. Major damage in the Hundalees, 
with 24 major slips between Oaro and Hundalee. Shingle Fans blocked SHI. Slip 5 
miles south of Clarence River bridge and at Rakautara. Major slip which buried the 
highway at Mangamaunu. Slip at Punchbowl. North of Kaikoura, SHI closed for 
approximately 24 hours, while to the south, SHI was closed by a slip just south of 
. Oaro for approximately 36 hours. 
24 June 1961- Snow affected SHI from Oaro to the Leader River bridge. 
July 1963 - SHI closed in many locations north and south of Kaikoura after 5 days 
of heavy rain. Slips from Tirohanga to Kekerengu. Slips and debris blocked SHI 
between the Blue Duck River and Mangamaunu. Slips at Waipapa Bay. Slips two 
miles south of the Clarence River. Flood waters from Middle Creek closed SHI. 
Washout just south of the Waiau River bridge blocked SHI and railway. Slip 
between Goose Bay and Kaikoura blocked traffic overnight. Slips in the Hundalees. 
Slips on the Charwell Cutting and near the Kahutara River bridge on H70. Heavy 
flood water rising over the Cribb Creek bridge closed H70. 
September 1963 - Flood damage to H70 (Kaikoura to Culverden). Lynton River 
overflowed and crossed the highway on the Kaikoura side of the bridge. 
March 1965 - H70 flood damage. Road closed for 36 hours. 
April 1965 - Flood damage between Kaikoura and Domett. Numerous slips between 
the Kahutara River and Oaro. Slips in Hundalees. 
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May 1966 - SHI flood damage between the Clarence River and Kaikoura. Traffic 
forced to divert via Lewis Pass. Slips in the Hundalees and surface water in the 
Leader River area, resulting in highway closures. Floodwater from the Kowhai River 
closed H70 briefly. Possible isolation of Kaikoura. 
July 1966- Flood damage to H70 
16-19 November 1967 - Flood damage to SHI from Tirohanga to Hurunui. H70 
flood damage, including damage at the Mason River bridge and the Lottery River 
bridge. 
August 1967 - Between Tirohanga and Cheviot, extensive damage to SHI. Slips 
between Tirohanga and Kaikoura. Slips between Kaikoura and Domett. Washout in 
Hundalees. SHI closed. 
April 1968 - H70 flood damage, including slips (Kaikoura County Section). SHI 
flood damage between Tirohanga and Hurunui. Slips between Tirohanga and 
Kaikoura. Clearing of shingle at Shingle Fans. Damage to sea-wall protection 
works and highway from heavy seas. 
November 1968 - shingle deposition at the Shingle Fans. 
April 1969 - Sea coast damage to SHI between the Clarence River and Oaro, 
especially north of Kaikoura between Half Moon Bay and Irongate. Damage at 
Rakautara. Flood damage between the Clarence River and Oaro. 
January 1971 - Flood damage between the Blue Slip and the Shingle Fans, Ohau 
Bluff and Mangamaunu, and the Kahutara River and the Hundalee Hills. 
August 1971 - Blue Slip closed SHI for five and a half hours. SHI damage also 
occurred from heavy seas, mainly between Ohau Bluff and Rakautara and between 
the Kahutara River and Raramai Tunnel. 
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May 1972 - Slips at Blue Slip and Shingle Fans (short disruptions). 
August 1973 - SHI sea coast damage (north and south of Kaikoura). 
April 1974 - Numerous slips in Hundalees (short disruptions). 
June 1974 - Very heavy seas (estimated to be 25 feet high) hit the Kaikoura Coast. 
Damage to SH1, particularly north of Kaikoura between Ohau Bluff and the Irongate 
River bridge and south of Kaikoura between the Kahutara River and Oaro. Near the 
Kahutara Bluff, SHI was reduced to a single lane. Significant damage at Rakautara 
where the highway was strewn with boulders and seaweed . 
. August 1974 - Damage to SHI from heavy seas. At Halfmoon Bay erosion was 
extensive. 
September 1974 - Waiau River bridge damaged. SHI was closed for 4 days. SHI 
closed for 24 hours by a slip in the Hundalee Hills. Numerous other slips in the 
Hundalees and along the Conway River. Flood damage on H70 washed out Cribb 
River bridge and the Humbug River bridge. H70 closed from September 4 to 
September 7. 
March 1975 - Extensive damage between Kekerengu and the Conway River. 
Damage was extensive between Deadman's Stream Bridge to Windy Gully Ford. 
The worst hit areas were between Okiwi Bay to Mangamaunu and between the 
Kahutara River and Oaro. Slip at Blue Slip. Slips and washouts between Black 
Miller Stream and the Hapuku River. The worst slip was at Black Miller Stream 
where almost 12,000 cubic yards of hillside fell across SHI. Bridge approaches to 
both Deadman's Stream and Washdyke Stream washed out. Between Oaro River and 
the Conway River there were extensive slips and washouts. Two miles north of 
Kaikoura water was two feet deep across SHI. A mile south of Kaikoura there was 
flood water across SHI. The worst damage was between the Kahutara River bridge 
to Windy Gully Ford. 
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June 1975 - SHI covered by surface flooding in many places. Up to a foot of water 
across SHI at Golf Links. Between Oaro and the Kahutara River and at Rakautara, 
the sea broke over in many places dumping rubble and kelp. 
September 1976 - SHI flood damage between the Clarence River and the Waiau 
River, particularly in the Hundalee Hills. 
July 1977 - SHI was closed from .11 am 21 July to 9.00am 22 July from a washout at 
Windy Gully and from slips between Oaro and Hundalee. Other areas of SHI both 
north and south of Kaikoura were subject to surface flooding. H70 was also closed 
between July 21 and July 22. 
April 1978 - Damage at Shingle Fans and through the Hundalees. SHI closed 
11.00pm 17 April to 1O.00am 18 ApriL Slips and washouts at RS118/08 south of 
the Clarence River and flood· damage between Oaro and Windy Gully Ford 
(RSI95/08). 
May 1978 - SHI was covered by shingle and seaweed at Rakautara. 
June 1978 - Rough seas caused erosion to SHI north and south of Kaikoura, mainly 
between Okiwi Bay (RPI18/09) and Mangamaunu and between the Kahutara River 
bridge and Oaro. 
July 1978 - Rough seas caused further erosion to SHI north and south of Kaikoura. 
March 1979 - Heavy coastal rain damaged SHI extensively. SHI was closed 
between Tirohanga and Mangamaunu from 7.30am 22 March to 11 am 24 March and 
from 1O.30pm 30 March to 1O.00am 31 March. The worst areas were Blue Slip, 
Kekerengu, Shades, Shingle Fans, Black Miller bridge, and the North Coast between 
Waipapa Bay and Mangamaunu and south of Kaikoura between the Kahutara River 
and Oaro. The White Slip (RP90/5.2 to RP90/5.8) was severely affected, the first 
serious trouble for approximately 15 years. The bridge approaches to Woodbanks 
Stream and Deadman's Stream were also washed out. 
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August 1979 - H70 closed for 3 days. 
October 1979 - H70 flood damage. Slip in Kekerengu area on SRI. 
March 1980 - For a period on March 3 Kaikoura was isolated by road. SHI was 
closed between 8pm 2 March to l1am 3 March. Damage extended from RS90 to 
Windy Gully Ford (RPI9517.93). There was surface flooding, scouring and large 
slips between Tirohanga and the Clarence River, particularly in the Kekerengu area. 
The Blue Slip uplifted an 80 metre length of SHI. The Shingle Fans topped the 
concrete fords, bypass bridge and training channels with shingle. Slips and surface 
flooding between the Clarence River bridge (RS118) and Kaikoura. Numerous slips 
. and scouring between the Kahutara River bridge and Windy Gully Ford 
(RPI9517.93). In the Hundalee Hills there were 4 major drop outs. H70 was also 
closed from March 2 to March 4. Road-users were forced to detour to the Lewis 
Pass. 
April 1980 - Shingle Fans again filled following rain. 
June 1982 - H70 closed following heavy rain (closed during weekend of 26 and 27 
June). Slip at Mason Hills. 
July 1983 - SHI damage (from high seas) between the Clarence River and Oaro. 
May 1985 - SHI damage from heavy seas. SHI closed in the Oaro section from 15 
May to 16 May. Alternative access was available via H70. Damage occurred on the 
northern section between RP118/9.1 and RP118/I9.0 and on the southern section 
between RPI63/4.5 and RPI63/I5.2. Damage was virtually continuous over the 
21km stretch. The Ohau Point area (RP118/13) was severely affected. 
July 1985 - RP90 to RP247/15.3 storm damage, including damage from huge seas. 
July 1986 - Storm damage to seawalls and foreshore, Clarence River to Oaro. Very 
large southerly seas. 
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August 1986 - slips in numerous locations on SHI. H70 also damaged. 
October 1986 - Tirohanga to Greta Village flood damage. Blue Slip blocked traffic 
for 5 hours and slips occurred in Hu~dalee Hills. 
April 1989 - Slip (300 cubic metres) at Ron's Rock about 10km south of Kaikoura. 
SHI partially blocked on the seaward side. 
September 1989 - Slip at Oaro (between the road tunnels) caused train derailment 
which closed SHI for 4 days. Surface flooding on two other occasions closed the 
road at various locations. 
May 1992 - SHI closure overnight at Punchbowl Comer. 
7 June 1992 - Small slips and falling debris, 6km south of the Conway River, then 
major slip. 
23 June 1992 - SHI closed at Punchbowl Comer for 13 days because of rock 
instability. H70 also closed for a day during this period because of ice (30 June). 
July 1992 - SHI and H70 south of Kaikoura closed by snow. 
1 July 1992 - Clear sea debris from SHI. 
8 July 1992 - Shingle Fans closed. Waipara to Oaro closed. 
9 and 10 July 1992 - Slips on Oaro Hill. 
13 July 1992 - Clear debris from Shingle Fans. Slips on Oaro Hill. Clear rock and 
debris (Puketa to Oaro). 
23 July 1992 - Clear debris from Shingle Fans. 
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26 August 1992 - Snow (Omihi and Hawkswood). 
27 August 1992 - SHI closed south of Kaikoura through Hundalee Hills. 
11 September 1992 - H70 closed by snow, except for 4WD vehicles. 
15 September 1992 - Rocks on highway at Willowa Point, Ohau Point and Seacoast 
South. 
16 September 1992 - Shingle Fans closed (until 17 September). Rocks on highway 
at Ohau Point, Seacoast South. 
18 September 1992 - Surface flooding north of Kaikoura. Rocks on highway at 
Ohau Point, Seacoast South, Shingle Fans closed (until 21 September). Slips at 
Mangamaunu and Oaro Hill. Minor slips and flooding Hawkswood to Hundalees 
and Parnassus to Kaikoura. 
21 September 1992 - Slip at Waipapa Bay, rocks on highway Seacoast South. 
28 September 1992 - Slip at Waipapa Bay. 
18 October 1992 - Slip at Ron's Rock (163/5.12), 10km south of Kaikoura. Three 
hour closure. 
21 October 1992 - Clear slip (179/2.40). 
24 October 1992 - Rockfalls at Ohau Point and Seacoast South. 
25 October 1992 - Rockfalls at Ohau Point, Irongate Stream, and Punchbowl 
Comer. 
28 October 1992 - Slips at Waipapa and Mangamaunu. 
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November 1992 - Slip between Rundalees and the Conway River. 
22 November 1993 - Slips blocking one lane just north of the Conway River. 
23 December 1993 - Slip 2km north of the Conway River. Surface flooding lkm 
north of Waiau River. Severe surface flooding on SRI at Greta and Siberia Ford. 
SRI closed at Omihi. 
23 and 24 December 1993 - Slips at Greta cutting and south of Cheviot. Waipara to 
Kaikoura closed. Waiau River broken banks and washed out approaches to bridge. 
·24 December 1993 - H70 closed (1305 hours) from washouts at Lottery Bridge, 
Upper Mason Bridge, and the Cribb Creek bridge. Traffic diverted via Lewis Pass. 
Kaikoura isolated for a brief period. NZ Post flew in Xmas mail to Kaikoura. 
20 February 1994 - Kaikoura Coast almost impassable because of slips between the 
two road tunnels. 
10 March 1994 - Slip 8km north of Leader River and 2km north of the Conway 
River. 
29 March 1994 - Slip 10km south of Kaikoura (3 hour closure). Northbound lane of 
SRI blocked by slip lkm north of Raramai Tunnel. 
25-27 July 1994 - Surface flooding at Cheviot. Flooding 3.2km south of the Jed 
River. Water across SRI at Siberia Ford. SRI was closed north of Kaikoura 
because of water at Middle Creek (138/15.60) and from a slip at Mangamaunu. 
South of Kaikoura, SHI was reduced to one lane at various places in the Rundalee 
Hills. R70 closed. 
29 September 1994 - Surface flooding north of the Conway River. 
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2 May 1995 - Slip at Blue Slip. 
6 May 1995 - SHI closed at Shingle Fans. 
19 May 1995 - Slip at White Slip. 
2 June 1995 - SHI and H70 south of Kaikoura closed by snow. Over a metre of 
snow from a southerly blast forced motorists to stay in Kaikoura until roads were 
cleared later in the day. Media reports indicated that accommodation was scarce in 
Kaikoura. 
12 June 1995 - In Kaikoura, an estimated 300mm of rain fell over 12 hours. SHI 
closed between Cheviot and Kaikoura because of slips and flooding (mainly in the 
Oaro area). SHI was single lane in many places. SHI also closed north of Kaikoura 
between Kekerengu and the Clarence River. Civil Defence put on alert. SHI 
opened lOam June 13. Reinstatement costs exceeded $200,000. 
14 June 1995 - SHI open but single lane access. 
15 June 1995 - Between Oaro and Parnassus single lane access because of slips and 
washouts. 
30 June 1995 - Oaro to Waipara Junction closed by snow (4 hours). 
2 July 1995 - Snow between Kaikoura and Parnassus. Snow and ice in Hundalees 
trapped road-users. Vehicles trapped for 4 hours while 30cm to 60cm of snow was 
cleared. 
6 August 1995 -- More than 160mm of rain was estimated to have fallen on the 
Kaikoura Coast in two days. SHI (and rail) closed at White Slip for much of 
Sunday. The hill (roughly estimated to be 1000 cubic metres) virtually moved 
sideways across SHI with grass and tussock remaining intact. Slips at Kekerengu 
(3000 cubic metres), Halfmoon Bay, and shingle aggradation at Shingle Fans (one 
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pile estimated to be higher than a 4WD vehicle). SH1 closed between 7.00am and 
3.00pm. Slips also closed SH1 between Kaikoura and Christchurch from 7.21am to 
8.46am. 
3 October 1995 - Slip (90/3.580). 
10 October 1995 - Rockfall and slip (RS90 to RS185). 
1 November 1995 - Rockfalls (163/4.00-9.30). 
6 November 1995 - Slip (118/19.98). Rockfall (138/0.42). 
26 December 1995 - Remove rock and debris (163/4.00-9.10). 
6 January 1996 - Remove rock and debris (163/4.00-9.10). 
7 January 1996 - Rockfall (118/13.20). 
15 January 1996 - Remove rock and debris (118/12.00). 
8 February 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4.0). 
19 February 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4.0). 
20 February 1996 - Rockfalls (118/13.0). 
21 February 1996 - Rockfalls (163/3.0). 
23 February 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4.0). 
6 Aril1996 - Flooding closed Shingle Fans. 
7 April 1996 - Flooding/rockfalls (RP90-185). 
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9 April 1996 - Rockfalls after heavy rain (163/4-6.5). 
30 April 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4-9.1). 
8 May 1996 - Rockfall at Punchbowl Comer (163/6.48). Rockfall at Paratitahi 
Tunnel (163/5.79). 
14 May 1996 - Rockfall (163/4.5). 
17 May 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4.0 and 9.0). 
22 May 1996 - Rockfalls/slips (118/12.78-5.15). 
26 May 1996 - Rockfalls (163/4;0-9.4). 
12 June 1996 - SHI closed Greta to Omihi (set up block Kaikoura side). Heavy 
snowfall (138/12.20). SHI closed for most of Wednesday, with little or no traffic 
heading south or arriving in Kaikoura from Christchurch. 
23 June 1996 - Shingle Fans closed. Rockfalls (163/4-9.10). Slip (90/3.10). 
24 June 1996 - Slip blocking traffic (90/3.10). Rockfalls/slips (163/4.91). Cars 
diverted to edge of rail. 
13 November 1996 - Heavy sea debris on SRI (118/16.76 and 163/15.80). 
29 November 1996 - Rock slip clearing at Ohau Point (118/13.00). 
31 December 1996 - Shingle Fans closed (until 2 January 1997). Slips between the 
Conway River and Siberia Ford (195/10.00). Three large rocks on SHI at Goose 
Bay (163/12.50). 
11 January 1997 - Shingle Fans closed (until 12 January). 
113 
9 February 1997 - Rockfall at Punchbowl Comer. SHI closed for period in 
morning and from mid afternoon to midnight. 
3 March 1997 - Clearance of rock at Punchbowl Comer (3 hour closure). 
8 March 1997 - Clearance of rock at Punchbowl Comer (4 hour closure). 
8 July 1997 - Rockfall (200m south of first tunnel, heading south). 
3 January 1998 - Small slip between road tunnels. 
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Appendix 2: Calculation of the additional costs incurred by road-
users (per day) when State Highway 1 to the north of Kaikoura is 
closed 
Each of the following 8 steps corresponds with the information contained in 
Chapter 4 (see section 4.3.3). 
1. Estimate AADT (less 10 per cent of vehicles outside the scope of the 
analysis) 
Cars 1174 
LCV 272 
MCV 68 
HCVI 51 
HCVII 119 
Buses 17 
Total 1701 vehicles per day 
2. 'Best' estimate vehicle movement assumptions: 
• 80 per cent of cars, LCV, MCV and 95 per cent of HCV and buses 
travel between Christchurch and Blenheim/Picton 
• All other· vehicles travel to Kaikoura (from Blenheim/Picton). 
Therefore: 
Vehicles travelling to/from Kaikoura: 
Cars 235 
LCV 54 
MCV 14 
HCVI 3 
HCVII 6 
Buses 1 
Vehicles travelling between Christchurch and Blenheim/Picton: 
Cars 939 
LCV 218 
MCV 54 
HCVI 48 
HCVII 113 
Buses 16 
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3. Estimate additional time costs and vae incurred by road-users via 
the Lewis Pass route 
Multiply the number of vehicles travelling between different nodes (above two 
tables) by the respective additional time costs and vac incurred via the 
Lewis Pass route (see Table 4.7 and 4.8). Therefore: 
Vehicles travelling to/from Kaikoura: 
Cars 235 * $231.51 
LCV 54 * $213.67 
MCV 14 * $282.51 
HCVI 3 * $352.56 
HCVII 6 * $391.39 
Buses 1 * $342.60 
Vehicles travelling between Christchurch and Blenheim/Picton: 
Cars 939 * $95.08 
LCV 218 * $87.71 
MCV 54 * $:117.35 
HCVI 48 * $146.86 
HCVII 113 * $166.38 
Buses 16 * $143.74 
The combined cost for Kaikoura traffic and Christchurch to Blenheim/Picton 
traffic is $216,535, assuming all road-users detour to the Lewis Pass route. 
4. Estimate the number of vehicles that may cancel their trip 
Vehicles travelling to/from Kaikoura: 
83% of cars and LCV cancel 
(ie. 244% cost increase via Lewis Pass route * demand elasticity value of 
0.34) 
100% of MCV, HCV and buses cancel when required to use the Lewis Pass 
route (based on conversations with road transport operators). 
Vehicles travelling between Christchurch and Blenheim/Picton: 
15% of cars and LCV cancel 
(ie. 45% cost increase via Lewis Pass route * demand elasticity value of 
0.34). 
All other commercial vehicles are assumed to detour because of passenger 
and freight commitments. 
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5. Account for cancellation costs 
Multiply the number of vehicles cancelling between different nodes by the 
respective additional time cost and vae incurred via the Lewis Pass route 
(see Table 4.7 and 4.8). The combined costs are $78,764. The loss of 
benefits for these road-users is assumed to be half the cost of detouring (ie. 
0.5 * $78,764 = $39,382). 
6. Calculate additional time costs and VOC (either because of detour or 
cancellation) 
Detour costs ($216,535) - Cancellation costs ($39,382) = $177,153 
7. Calculate additional accident costs 
Multiply the number of vehicles travelling between different nodes (not 
including road-users who cancel their trip) by the additional accident costs 
incurred via the Lewis Pass route (see Table 4.7 and 4.8). Total additional 
accident costs are $40,242. 
8. Calculate total additional road-user costs incurred (per day) when 
the Kaikoura to Blenheim link is closed 
Additional time costs and yac ($177, 153) + Additional accident costs 
($40,242) = $217,395 (which corresponds with Table 4.9). 
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Appendix 3: Closure scenarios presented to respondents 
Scenario 1 
In 1992, a minor earthquake caused rock instability problems at Punchbowl Corner, 
12km south of Kaikoura. State Highway 1 was closed for 13 days while the 
rockface was stabilised. The rail line was not affected. During this period, most 
traffic diverted to the Inland Road. However, media reports indicated that some 
businesses in Kaikoura experienced a downturn in business because the town had 
fewer visitors. 
During the 13 day Punchbowl closure, the Inland Road was also closed for one day 
because of snow. Kaikoura was isolated by road from the south for one day. 
The event is summarised in the table below. 
Route Length of closure 
State Highway 1 (north) Not closed 
State Highway 1 (south) 13 days 
Inland Road (south) 1 day 
Rail line Not closed 
Please assume that the event occurs at a time when your business experiences 
'average'turnover. 
Scenario 2 
Assume that during the 13 day Punchbowl closure on State Highway 1, the Inland 
Road was closed for 7 days (instead of one). Kaikoura would be isolated by road 
from the south for 7 days. Most northbound and southbound traffic would bypass 
Kaikoura. 
The event is summarised in the table below. 
Route Length of closure 
State Highway 1 (north) Not closed 
State Highway 1 (southl 13 days 
Inland Road (south) 7 days 
Rail Not closed 
Please assume that the event occurs at a time when your business experiences 
'average'turnover. 
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Scenario 3 
Within the next 12 months, it is possible that a major earthquake will strike the 
northern part of the Kaikoura District. The Hope Fault, which crosses State 
Highway 1 at Ohau Point, will rupture the highway surface and cause major 
landslides and rock instability problems. North of Kaikoura, State Highway 1 and 
the rail line are expected to be closed for 13 days. Most northbound and southbound 
traffic would bypass Kaikoura. 
The event is summarised in the table below. 
Route Length of closure 
State Highway 1 (north) 13 days 
State Highway 1 (south) Not closed 
Inland Road (south) Not closed 
Rail line 13 days 
Please assume that the event occurs at a time when your business experiences 
'average' turnover. 
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Appendix 4: Survey used to guide interviews 
Introduction 
The purpose of this interview is to determine how your business may be affected 
when the main highways which provide access to Kaikoura (ie. State Highway 1 and 
the Inland Road) are closed by natural hazards (eg. from slips, flooding, snow, 
earthquakes etc). 
Part A: Disruption awareness 
The purpose of the following questions is to find out how aware you are of the 
closure threat in the Kaikoura District. 
1. Prior to me contacting you, were you aware that State Highway 1 and the Inland 
Road are vulnerable to closure from natural hazards? 
DYes D No If NO, go to question 4. 
2. Has your business ever been affected by a highway closure caused by natural 
hazards? 
DYes If YES, when? DNO If NO, go to question 4. 
3. How disruptive were these closures for your business? 
4. Do you think it is likely that your business will be affected by highway closures 
caused by natural hazards in the future? 
DYes If YES, why? D No If NO, why not? 
5. Which natural hazard (if any) do you believe is most likely to cause the longest 
road closure(s) in the Kaikoura District? 
6. How long (how many hours or days) do you think one of the highways providing 
access to Kaikoura could be closed (in a worst case scenario)? 
DHours DDayS 
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7. How long (how many hours or days) do you think all highways providing access 
to Kaikoura could be closed simultaneously (in a worst case scenario)? 
o Hours o Days 
Part B: Transport Dependence 
The next stage of this interview aims to provide information about the ways in which 
your business depends on the road network. 
1. What percentage of your businesses needs (eg. goods and services) is supplied by 
the local community? 
2. What percentage of your turnover comes from: 
the local community 
passing trade (ie. short stop visitors) 
tourists to Kaikoura 
markets outside the Kaikoura District 
TOTAL 
----_% 
-----_% 
----_% 
----_% 
100 % 
3. Can you describe the ways in which your business depends on: 
• State Highway 1 to the North of Kaikoura (including how frequently you depend 
on this route) 
• State Highway 1 to the South of Kaikoura (including how frequently you depend 
'on this route) 
• The Inland Road (including how frequently you depend on this route) 
• Rail transport (including how frequently you depend on rail transport) 
• Other forms of transport (if any) (including how frequently you depend on the 
these forms of transport) 
Part C: Closure scenarios 
The next stage of this interview asks you about three closure scenarios (ie. three 
possible closure events). The purpose of the scenarios is to provide insights into the 
ways in which your business may be affected. To give you an idea of the types of 
closures I will ask you to consider, I will show you some photos which illustrate the 
type of damage that can occur. Before I ask the first series of questions, can you 
please read scenario 1. 
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Questions about scenario 1 
1. How disruptive would this event be for your business? 
(or How disruptive was this event for your business? How disruptive would the event be for your 
business now?) 
2. Why? 
3. Would your business experience a loss in turnover? 
(or Did your business experience a loss in turnover? Would your business experience a loss in 
turnover now?) 
DYes D No If NO, why not (then go to scenario 2)? 
4. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would your business 'first' 
experience a loss in turnover? Why? 
(or after what length of time (how many hours or days) did your business first experience a loss in 
turnover? Would it take this length of time now?) 
DHOUfS DDayS 
5. Would further losses in turnover during the 13 day closure period seriously affect 
the wellbeing of your business (ie. would your business eventually 'feel the pinch')? 
(or did further losses in turnover during the 13 day closure period seriously affect the wellbeing of 
your business (ie. did your business eventually 'feel the pinch')? What about now?) 
D Yes If YES, please explain the D No If NO, why not? 
implications of further losses 
for your business. 
(then go to question 7) 
6. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would the wellbeing of your 
business be seriously affected? Why? 
(or after what length of time (how many hours or days) was the wellbeing of your business seriously 
affected? Would it take this length of time now?) 
DHours DDayS 
7. What percentage reduction in daily turnover would you expect (on average) until 
all routes were reopened? 
(or What percentage reduction in daily turnover did you have (on average) until all routes were 
reopened? What is your best estimate of the percentage reduction in turnover now?) 
8. Why do you estimate this amount? 
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9. When all routes were reopened, after what length of time (how many hours or 
days) would you expect your business to return to its pre-closure level of activity and 
turnover? Why? 
(when all routes reopened, after what length of time (how many hours or days) did your business 
return to its pre-closure level of activity and turnover? Would it take this length of time now?) 
D Hours D Days 
Questions about Scenario 2 
1. How disruptive would this event be compared to scenario I? 
2. Why? 
3. Would your business experience a loss in turnover? 
DYes D No If NO, why not (then go to scenario 3)? 
4. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would your business 'first' 
experience a loss in turnover? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
5. Would further losses in turnover during the 13 day closure period seriously affect 
the wellbeing of your business (ie. would your business eventually 'feel the pinch')? 
DYes If YES, please explain the 
implications of further losses 
for your business. 
D No If NO, why not? 
(then go to question 7) 
6. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would the wellbeing of your 
business be seriously affected? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
7. What percentage reduction in daily turnover would you expect (on average) until 
all routes were reopened? 
8. Why do you estimate this amount? 
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9. When all routes were reopened, after what length of time (how many hours or 
days) would you expect your business to return to its pre-closure level of activity and 
turnover? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
Questions about Scenario 3 
1. How disruptive would this event be compared to scenario 1 and scenario 2? 
2. Why? 
3. Would your business experience a loss in turnover? 
DYes DNO If NO, why not (then go to general questions)? 
4. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would your business 'first' 
experience a loss in turnover? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
5. Would further losses in turnover during the 13 day closure seriously affect the 
wellbeing of your business (ie. would your business eventually 'feel the pinch')? 
DYes If YES, please explain the 
implications of further losses 
for your business. 
D No .If NO, why not? 
(then go to question 7) 
6. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would the wellbeing of your 
business be seriously affected? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
7. What percentage reduction in daily turnover would you expect (on average) until 
all routes were reopened? 
8. Why do you estimate this amount? 
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9. When all routes were reopened, after what length of time (how many hours or 
days) would you expect your business to return to its pre-closure level of activity and 
turnover? Why? 
DHours DDayS 
General questions about all scenarios considered 
1. If these types of scenarios (ie. long-term closures) occurred during your busiest 
periods (eg. in the high season) would the impacts be any different? 
DYes If Yes, in what ways? D No If NO, why not? 
2. If these types of scenarios (ie. long-term closures) occurred during your quiet 
periods (eg. in theJow season) would the impacts be any different? 
. DYes If Yes, in what ways? DNO If NO, why not? 
Part D: Transferability 
The next stage of this interview aims to· provide insights into your ability to 
overcome the effects of road closures. 
1. Does your business currently compensate for the possibility of road closure (eg. 
by carrying higher levels of stock)? 
D Yes If Yes, in what ways? D No If NO, why not (then go to question 3)? 
2. To what extent do these measures help minimise potential impacts? 
3. During any of the three closure scenarios considered, would you make any 
adjustments (eg. would you obtain supplies by rail) to help reduce the impacts? 
D Yes If Yes, what are they and 
for which scenarios? 
D No If NO, why not? 
(then go to question 6) 
4. To what extent would these measures help minimise potential impacts? 
5. After what length of time (how many hours or days) would you make these 
adjustments? 
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6. Is there anything your business could do to be better prepared for future closures? 
D Yes If Yes, what? DNO If NO, why not? 
7. Is there anything else you would like to say? 
Part E: Business information 
The purpose of the final series of questions is to provide background information 
about your business. 
1. What type of business do you operate (eg. restaurant, hotel etc)? 
2. Do you own or manage this business? 
Down DManage 
3. How long have you 'owned' or 'managed' this business? 
DMonths DYears 
4. What is the gross annual turnover of this business? 
5. How many full-year full-time persons does this business employ (40 hours per 
week=1 full-time employee)? 
6. How many full-year part-time persons does this business employ (and on average, 
how many hours per week do each of these persons work)? 
7. How many seasonal persons does this business employ (and on average, how 
many hours per week and weeks per year do each of these persons work)? 
